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INTRODUCTION

All of us well-socialized Westerners know that discrimination
against other human beings is wrong. Yet we also realize, if we
think about it at all, that we discriminate against others routinely
and inevitably. We all know it is wrong to refuse to hire women as
truck drivers, to refuse to let blacks practice law, to bar Moslems
from basketball teams, or to refuse to sit next to Rastafarians at
lunch counters. At the same time, we also know it is not wrong to
refuse to hire the blind as truck drivers, to refuse to admit those
who flunk the bar exam to the practice of law, to bar short, slow,
uncoordinated persons from the basketball team, or to refuse to sit
next to people who haven't bathed recently.
What explains and justifies the distinctions we make between
discrimination that is wrongful and discrimination that is not? I
argue in this article that answering this question is much more
difficult than most people assume. Indeed, despite the fact that the
morality and legality of discrimination have been at the forefront of
academic inquiry for about three decades, the fundamental question
about discrimination-What distinguishes wrongful discrimination
from permissible forms of discrimination?-has seldom been
addressed, much less answered.
Of course, I do not deny that some answers have been offered.
Many people, at least when first asked, respond that basing discrimination on immutable traits such as race or gender is what makes
discrimination wrong. The implausibility of this answer is exposed
by the many instances where discrimination based on immutable
traits is not regarded as wrong (for example, refusing to hire the
blind as truck drivers), and by those instances of wrongful discrimination involving mutable characteristics (for example, barring
Moslems from the basketball team). Similarly, labeling a trait on
which discrimination is based as "irrelevant" begs the question of
what makes the trait irrelevant. After all, the trait is relevant to the
discriminator, whose purposes in choosing can be quite varied and
1
complex.
SeeJAN NARvESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 316-18 (1988):

Further conundrums loom as we reflect further. What constitutes a
"job"? This is important for the following reason. If we are to try to spell
out the ideas of "discrimination" in terms of "morally irrelevant," and in
turn to make relevance turn on the job to be done, with its appropriate
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criteria of competence, then the concept of wrongful discrimination would
seem to be determined by the type ofjob it is--by the job description, as we
shall call it (meaning, not just what is put in the advertisements, but rather
the set of objectives that the holder of that job is, as such, to be pursuing).
The idea is that it is wrong to hire persons for reasons other than those
related to performance on thejob-meaning, then, the job as described. But
who describes the job? That is to say, whose job is it?
If the job is in the "private sector" of the economy, it would seem that
this description is determined by the owners of the firm, normally through
their higher-level employees, the managers. Is there any limit to the way in
which they can frame ajob description? For example, can they say "Wanted:
Secretary/mistress: Successful applicants will be chosen on the basis of
probable performance in the office and in bed. Here's a picture of your
boss-to-be: ... ."? Or "Wanted: black stenographer"? Or what about
"Professor of Logic-definite advantage if applicant is black"?
On one view of the matter, they could do this. In the case of the
mistress/secretary, they likely wouldn't get a very good response to their
ads, though (and perhaps the ones who did reply would be rejected as
"unsuitable"-insufficiently sexually attractive, say). And then we may say
that those who apply to ads that didn't include the extra bit about bed
performance and then are turned down for reasons actually having to do
with that have indeed been unjustly treated, for the job has been misrepresented. They have been wasting their time applying, for the job they thought
they were applying for isn't the one they were being "looked over" for!
(Suppose the job description said: "secretary/coffeemaker: in addition to
usual secretarial skills, successful applicant is to make and serve coffee to
senior staff, etc." The inclusion of this not unusual supplement to a
secretarial ad would, I think, solve a lot of problems, for manypeople would
apply for such a job. Would those who would apply have a legitimate
complaint? Is there fixed somewhere in the heavens an Essence of Secretary
that clearly specifies that secretaries are not to make coffee for those whose
secretaries they are?)
Similarly, if the claim about injustice is based on this consideration,
then employers who want to discriminate on the basis of race, for instance,
could also do so so long as their ads were properly worded. But the
Ontario Civil Rights Commission would not allow this, and neither would
the current version of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor
the current interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by American judges.
Should these documents forbid such things?
There is a difficulty in doing so, since sometimes the forbidden values
of [a characteristic possessed by one job candidate but not another] will be
relevant to the job. For a chorus line or a model for women's underwear,
the employer does want a woman; for other purposes, a black person may
be just what is needed (cf. the Black Muslim Church ofAmerica); and so on.
On what grounds does the government decide whether this kind of
distinction is "discrimination" or not? What if the Catholic Church
discriminates against women for the priesthood? (There was recently a todo in the papers concerning a girl who wanted to function as an acolyte, this
being contrary to Catholic tradition. Did she have a case?) How about
when the Black Muslim Church discriminates against white persons? Or the
E[c]uadorian Friendship Society discriminates against non-E[c]uadorian
applicants forjanitorial or secretarial positions; or.... These are all jobs
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Other suggested answers point to the historical and contemporary statuses of various groups as the key to understanding what is
"wrong" about wrongful discrimination. I believe these answers are
closer to the mark, though in need of considerable refinement. Are
all novel forms of discrimination-say, against blue-eyed personsunproblematic merely because they do not target a group that
historically has been the subject of widespread discrimination? Or
given that the group of persons with low IQs and few academic
achievements also suffers from very low socioeconomic status in
contemporary society, is discrimination against such persons in the
job market now wrongful?
In what follows I am going to approach the question of what
makes discrimination wrongful by examining discrimination as an
expression of various types of preferences. Part I briefly sets forth
the framework that I am assuming in assessing the morality of
discrimination. Part II examines various types of preferences and
the discrimination to which they give rise. Part III attempts to
formulate the results of the previous section insofar as they reveal
the factors central to the wrongfulness of wrongful discrimination.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the results suggest that the line between
wrongful and acceptable discrimination is, in most cases, difficult to
locate with precision because it is historically and culturally variable.
This line is historically and culturally variable because it is, in most
cases, a function of consequentialist considerations rather than
deontological norms. That is, in most cases, discrimination, when
it is wrongful, is contingently but not intrinsically so.
A word about the form this inquiry takes. The reader will no
doubt find herself from time to time becoming increasingly impatient with the multitude of distinctions drawn-distinctions among
types of discriminatory preferences and among the contexts in
which they occur-and with the rather elaborate taxonomy I
construct out of those distinctions. I understand that impatience,
especially because the subject is so emotionally charged. Yet, for
better or worse, those distinctions are my message. Discrimination
is not one thing, but many. Failure to recognize this point results
in intellectual and moral confusion as well as bad policy.
Furthermore, the reader should not expect a sustained, rigorous
philosophical argument. I offer no full-blown normative theory as
that could be done by women, or whites, or non-E[c]uadorians, and so on.
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a backdrop for my discussion of discrimination, nor any metaethical
position. What the reader will find instead is a somewhat messy
blend of deontological and consequentialist considerations brought
to bear on a variety of forms and contexts of discrimination. The

"philosophy" in the article, if it can be called that, is of a very
rough, street-level, colloquial style. I am more interested in sorting
things out than in wrapping them up, and what rigor there is lies in
that sorting.
One final point: although there are no good systematic treatments of the morality of discrimination, I cite below five
previous works of more limited scope that have been enormously
helpful and influential in my thinking about the subject.2 Any
serious inquiry into the morality of discrimination should begin with

them.
I. BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS
Many discussions of discrimination suffer from failure to be
clear about the context in which discrimination is to be assessed.
Discrimination by government officials may be morally as well as
legally different from discrimination by private parties.
Discrimination in the workplace may be morally as well as legally
different from discrimination in one's choice of friends. And
discrimination that exacerbates an unjust distribution of wealth may
be morally different from discrimination that occurs within an
otherwise just society.
Six assumptions provide the framework for my discussion of
discrimination. First, I deal exclusively with discrimination by
private parties, not discrimination by government officials.
Although I believe that the morality of private discrimination bears
heavily on the morality of public discrimination, I do not intend to
discuss the latter in any way.

Second, I assume that in a just society there will be an area of
liberty in which private people are permitted to express their
preferences with respect to their intimate companions, their
associates, their employees and employers, the salaries they pay and
2

Those works are: GORDON W. ALLPORT, NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); HENRI
TAJFEL, HUMAN GRoUPs AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES (1981); Paul Brest, Foreword: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976); Richard A.
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and PreferentialTreatment" An Approach to the Topics, 24
UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977); Alan WertheimerJobs, Qualifications,and Preferences, 94
ETHIcs 99 (1983).
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the salaries they work for, and the goods and services they consume.
In other words, I assume as background that ajust society is realized
in a liberal democratic society with a sizeable free market sector and
a rich realm of personal liberty and privacy. What I have to say will
thus have much less relevance in a socialist society and none in a
totalitarian one. Therefore, if someone believes that there can be
no social justice in any society with a large domain of private
freedom of choice, including a substantial free market, that person
will find my project entirely misguided and diversionary. Why
worry about the morality of a private choice to avoid black or
female employees when justice would not countenance any
employer freedom to choose employees?
The third assumption I make is perhaps the most crucial
because it focuses on a point that engenders considerable confusion
in discussions of discrimination. I assume as background the
existence of a just society, one in which each person is guaranteed
those political and civil rights and the minimum standard of living
that justice requires. I am not going to argue for any particular
theory of justice, nor will I claim that any particular society fully
satisfies the correct theory of justice. I am only going to assume
that, for purposes of assessing the morality of private discrimination, every individual receives the minimum rights and resources
justice requires.
This third assumption will seem unusually strong to some
readers. I make it, however, to avoid what I perceive is a constant
source of confusion in the literature on discrimination.
Our
reactions to instances of discrimination are often colored by our
sense that many victims of such discrimination have generally
received a "raw deal" at the hands of society and face grinding
poverty, a lack of education, and the concomitant bleak prospects
for any kind of self-fulfilling, fully human existence. If we believe
that ajust society would not permit such human degradation, then
we will also view private discrimination that reinforces or worsens
such conditions as unjust. What I wish to ask, however, is whether
there is anything morally distinctive about some kinds of discrimination apart from their contribution to social conditions that are
unjust on independent grounds, or does achievement of a just
society eliminate all potential moral criticisms of private discriminatory choices? In short, for purposes of moral assessment, I want to
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isolate discriminatory choices from all the other wrongmaking

factors with which they are frequently associated. 3
A corollary of the previous two, my fourth assumption is that
one can have a moral right to do what is morally wrong. The only
dissent from this position among mainstream Western philosophers

comes from act-consequentialists. For them, assessing an act of
private discrimination is no different from assessing any other act:
no act is intrinsically wrong, and any act may be wrong depending
on its consequences. 4 Putting aside the act-consequentialists, most
philosophers agree that having the moral liberty to do X does not

mean that doing X is either morally correct or free from moral
criticism. Surely the libertarians, who argue for the widest realm of
liberties, generally concede that exercise of those liberties can be

subject to moral evaluation and criticism. 5 Even more conventional
liberals, who countenance a good deal more regulation of private
choices, distinguish between having a moral right to choose and
exercising that choice in a morally correct way. 6 Most discussions
of rights are attempts to fix those boundaries, and acts that fall
within those boundaries represent virtually uncharted territory from

the standpoint of moral analysis. This article is in part an attempt
7
to begin mapping that domain.

3 Another assumption, too closely related to the third assumption to warrant
independent discussion, is that social justice is ordinarily, though not always, best
promoted through macro policies addressed to wealth distribution, access to
education, and reparations for denials ofjust entitlements, rather than through micro
policies that target private choices.
An alternative to bracketing the issue of social justice in this manner would be
to count among the morally relevant effects of private discrimination its aggravationor, in some cases, its amelioration-of unjust conditions. I believe that this alternative
would be much messier analytically than the bracketing alternative, although it may
be the case that my preference for dealing with social justice through macro policies
affects my perception of the relative analytical merits of these alternatives.
4 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 268-69 (1986) (noting that
strict consequentialists believe that no act is intrinsically wrong).
5
See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 31-32 (1974)
(distinguishing between political philosophy, with its focus on rights, and moral
philosophy, which is broader).
6 See e.g., DAvID HAMLIN, THE NAZi/SKOKIE CONFLICT 50, 123 (1980) (acknowledging that Nazi doctrine is "monstrous and evil," yet supporting Nazis' right to
demonstrate in the presence ofJewish counterdemonstrators); Alan Wertheimer, Two
Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 211, 239 (1984)
(stating that "[i]t is commonplace that the realm of... rights.., is only part of our
moral landscape").
7 My analysis will necessarily be different from a straight law and economics
approach since the latter takes all preferences as givens-as exogenous factors-which
are not themselves subject to a law and economics critique. My analysis speaks to our
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In my fifth assumption, I part company with the more extreme
libertarians. I assume that when an exercise of liberty is seriously
morally wrong, there is reason to doubt that moral liberty extends
to such exercise. I assume therefore that although there is a realm
of moral liberty that covers most of our acts of discrimination,
including morally wrong acts of discrimination, some seriously
morally wrong acts of discrimination do not fall within this realm of
moral liberty. Thus, determining that an act of discrimination is
morally wrong gives us a reason, though not a conclusive one, to
think that the act may not be within the realm of moral liberty. If
the act is both morally wrong and outside the realm of moral
liberty, we have a reason, though again not a conclusive one, to
prohibit it by law and attach sanctions to its exercise.
My sixth and final assumption follows from the others. What I
have to say about the morality of various types of discrimination will
be relevant to, though not conclusive of, various legal concerns.
Identifying a type of discrimination as morally wrong provides some
reason for prohibiting it legally. A moral analysis of discrimination,
therefore, might inform the interpretation of both statutory and
constitutional law and should inform proposals for or against legal
change. Although I am not primarily engaging in legal analysis, my
inquiry is surely of major importance to the law.
II. DISCRIMINATION AND PREFERENCES
We discriminate against certain people and in favor of others
because the satisfaction of our preferences leads us to do so. As
they relate to discrimination, these preferences break down into two
main divisions: preferences for and against certain people and
preferences for various goods and services. Both kinds of preferences lead inevitably to discrimination. But discrimination that
flows from preferences for and against people raises issues that are
distinct from those raised by discrimination flowing from preferences for various goods and services.
The reader should keep in mind throughout the following
discussion of types of preferences that determining which of these
ideal types underlies any particular act of discrimination in the real
world will often prove quite difficult or impossible. Many of these
ideal types blend into one another and produce borderline
examples that cannot be classified without controversy. Moreover,

foundational moral entitlements and is logically prior to efficiency considerations.
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many real world preferences are arguably mixtures of the ideal types
I describe. Nonetheless, the following purified taxonomy should
guide any moral inquiry in the always messy and ambiguous
empirical world.
A. Preferencesfor and Against ParticularKinds of People

When it comes to choosing our employees or employers, our
colleagues, our friends, our spouses, or our regular golf groups, we
are selective. Only the most unusual person makes these selections
in a purely random fashion. The more virtuous among us might
base their choices on morally valued qualities of character. Thus,
they might seek associations with the wise, the just, the compassionate, the brave, and the loyal. Most of us look, however, for traits in
our associates in addition to the moral virtues, traits that are less
morally freighted, such as a sense of humor, a similarity of outlook,
and physical attractiveness. And sometimes we look for traits that
are more problematic, such as membership in a certain race, ethnic
group, or religion.
Preferences for people, and the contexts in which those preferences arise, can be morally evaluated based on what they reveal
about the moral qualities of those who have the preferences. Thus,
a person who prefers a member of her own race as a spouse, but
who is happy to work and play alongside members of other races,
presents a different moral case from a person who prefers members
of her own race in all contexts. The latter preference is a categorical racial preference, whereas the former is a contextual racial
preference that is, for most people, much less morally troublesome.
1. Categorical Preferences for People: The Problem of Biases
Sometimes discrimination reflects the discriminator's biases for
and against certain types of people. Biases, or differential moral
concern, tend to be reflected in categorical preferences for and
against certain types of people, that is, preferences that hold
regardless of context. Thus, a Nazi who regards Aryans as more
worthy of moral concern than others, and Jews as less worthy, will
usually manifest these biases by preferring associations with Aryans
and dispreferring associations with Jews in all contexts, from
marriage to employment.
The Nazis' biases were both intrinsically morally wrong and
profoundly devastating in their effects, effects that need not and
cannot be recounted here. Their biases were intrinsically morally
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wrong because Jews are clearly not of lesser moral worth than
Aryans. When a person is judged incorrectly to be of lesser moral
worth and is treated accordingly, that treatment is morally wrong
regardless of the gravity of its effects. It represents a failure to
show the moral respect due the recipient, a failure which is by itself
sufficient to be judged immoral.
Not all biases are like those of the Nazis, however, even if we set
effects aside. First, some biases are not uncontroversially intrinsically wrong. Many believe that all persons deserve equal concern and
respect,' but many others believe that the morally virtuous deserve
more concern and respect than the morally vicious. 9 For this
group, a bias in favor of the virtuous and against the vicious is not
only morally permissible but morally required.
It would be tempting to say that, except for biases in favor of
the morally virtuous and against the morally vicious, all biases are
morally illegitimate bases for preferences and the acts that express
them. Surely this is the case with historically important biases, such
as biases against members of particular races, genders, nationalities,
or religions. No plausible theory regards blacks, females, the Irish,
or the Jews as meriting less moral concern than whites, males,
Germans, or Protestants merely by virtue of their status as a
member of the former group. Of the multitude of everyday types
of discrimination, based on aptitudes, skills, physical characteristics,
and personality traits, no one seriously entertains the thought that
those not preferred are less morally worthy than those preferred.
Yet it overstates the case to say moral virtue and vice are the
only plausible bases for differential moral concern. Some people
maintain that it is morally permissible, laudatory, or even obligatory
to feel more concern for the welfare of kin, tribe, community, or
nation than for the welfare of others. We do not simply tolerate
ethnic, local, and national pride: we celebrate it. Many of us view
as morally deficient rather than as properly unbiased one who shows
10
no more concern for his own child than for that of another.
The moral analysis of the realm of bias-differential moral
concern-is messy, but some tentative conclusions can be drawn
from common moral intuitions and reflection thereon. First, except
8

See e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-83 (1977); JOHN

RAWIS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 504-12 (1971).
9
See, e.g., GEORGE SHER, DESERT 142-49 (1987).
10

See Bernard Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1

(Bernard Williams ed., 1981).
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(controversially) for the traits identifying the morally virtuous and
vicious, no other traits differentiate those who merit greater and
lesser moral concern than others. Along all other axes, people are
moral equals.
Second, personal commitments, relations, and identifications
morally permit and may require particular persons to have greater
moral concern for some than for others, even if the preferred
individuals merit no greater moral concern from people in general
because they possess no greater moral worth than others. My family
and my neighbors are morally no more worthy and deserving of
concern than others' families or neighbors, but they are certainly
more deserving of my concern.
Third, morally favoring a small group and (relatively) morally
disfavoring the rest of humanity has a different moral quality from
morally disfavoring a small group. This is so primarily because the
disfavoring of a small group is less likely to be the logical corollary
of positive personal commitments and ties to others than it is to be
the manifestation of an ideology that proclaims erroneously that
members of the small group are morally unworthy. Put differently,
my ties to the Alexanders do not require me to believe that the
Joneses are morally inferior. Any "ties" I feel towards the white
race, however, to the extent they produced anti-black bias, would
most likely be based on an ideology of black moral inferiority.
The significance of this distinction between morally favoring
large groups and morally favoring small groups should not be
overstated. When the "small" groups approach the size of ethnic
groups or nations, it is quite likely that group favoritism has as its
corollary widespread belief in the moral inferiority of nonmembers.
A belief that one's small ethnic group is a morally chosen people
will quite naturally entail a concomitant belief in outsiders' moral
inferiority.
Moreover, one reason why it is difficult to disentangle special
concern for "one's own" from beliefs in others' moral inferiority is
because in humankind's primitive past, these two attitudes were
inextricably linked. When we roamed the earth in small kinship
groups, and every tribe but one's own was a deadly enemy, love of
one's kin and hatred and/or suspicion of everyone else were traits
necessary for survival. We may be conditioned by our primitive past
so that cosmopolitan moral views are much easier to attain
intellectually than emotionally.1 1 Without the emotional prop, a
11 See Christopher T. Wonnell, CircumventingRadsm: ConfrontingtheProblemofthe
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belief in the equal moral worth of those outside one's tribe may be
fragile. Leaving aside differential moral concern for the especially
virtuous and vicious, one conclusion to be drawn from the discussion of biases to this point is that biases premised on the belief that
some types of people are morally worthier than others are intrinsi-

cally morally wrong because they reflect incorrect moral judgments.
On the other hand, because they are not based on judgments of
differential moral worth, "biases" that reflect real personal attachments to family and locale are not intrinsically morally wrong.
There are two further points about biases that bear on whether
one should have a moral right to act on them, even if doing so is
morally wrong. First, biases that are intrinsically morally wrong
because they reflect incorrectjudgments of differential moral worth
are usually not central to personal identity. To the extent they are
fully conscious, they should be eradicable relatively easily through
moral education, at least for those who have plausible sources of
self-esteem besides believing that another group is morally inferior
to theirs. The belief in blacks' intrinsic moral inferiority was
probably not a deep-seated aspect of whites' personalities even in
the period of its dominance, which explains the ideology's rather
quick disappearance (in historical perspective), except as an isolated
phenomenon associated with fringe groups.
Those who think the previous paragraph's relegation of antiblack bias to history's dustbin reflects willful blindness, naivet6, or
malice should remember that I am dealing with bias, a judgment
that those with a certain trait are morally less worthy than others
merely by virtue of possessing that trait. I am not dealing with
stereotypes and proxies, judgments that persons with a certain trait
are quite likely to possess other traits that are proper bases for
attributing differential moral worth. A person who believes, not
that being black per se makes one morally less worthy, but that
being black statistically correlates quite highly with being a criminal-a trait that more plausibly reflects lower moral worth-is not
biased in the same sense that I am discussing in this section.
However, inaccurate stereotypes are frequently the product of biases
which have been disavowed intellectually but which still govern
emotionally and create "tastes" for erroneous beliefs. Stereotypes
and the proxy judgments based upon stereotypes are much more

Affirmative Action Ideology, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 95, 106. But see TAJFEL, supra note 2,
at 129-30 (expressing skepticism about socio-biological, as opposed to cognitive,
explanations of prejudice).
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difficult to eradicate than conscious biases because they frequently
reflect accurate or at least plausible factual judgments and an
understandable aversion to risk, and because when they do not, they
12
are most likely the product of biases that are not fully conscious.
I feel much less confident in what I have said about the relative
lack of depth of conscious biases and their relatively easy eradication through moral education when we turn from bias against a
particular group to biases that reflect a relatively small group's sense
of its own moral superiority. Perhaps the latter biases are relatively
deep features of the group's members' personalities. Nonetheless,
I tend to doubt it. For remember that here we are dealing with
judgments of differential moral worth. We are not dealing with
personal loyalties and commitments, where differential moral
concern is detached from judgments of differential moral worth.
Nor are we dealing with stereotypes and proxies. Tribal loyalties
and commitments and stereotypical judgments can account, I think,
for most instances of what might otherwise appear to be judgments
of one's own group's moral superiority.
The second point about biases is that they can have devastating
social consequences. The more people within a society who are
biased against another social group, the worse the consequences will
be, because bias, as I have defined it, will show up in all contexts for
choices, from the most intimate to the most public. Moreover, to
the extent the biased group is generally better placed on the
socioeconomic ladder than the group that is the target of bias, the
social consequences are likely to be worse.
These harmful social consequences are likely to be both psychological and material. Members of the disfavored group will feel
either stigmatized and inferior or insulted and angry. Their sense
of well-being will in either case be reduced. Some may be moved
to violence. Moreover, discrimination against them in the job
market, a natural consequence of bias, will tend to reduce their
aspirations, their energy, and consequently their productivity, to
their detriment and to the detriment, in material terms at least, of
the biased group as well.
These harmful social consequences depend upon the number of
people among the biased and the disfavored groups and their
relative socioeconomic status. If only a handful of people are
biased, few if any harmful psychological or material effects will be
12 For a full discussion of unconscious biases, stereotypes, and proxies, see infra
Part II.C.l.b.
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produced. If the disfavored group is socially and economically
dominant, it is unlikely either to feel psychological harm or to have
its productivity affected. Moreover, widespread bias against a
disfavored group low on the socioeconomic ladder occasionally
produces a sense of superiority and a redoubling of effort by that
group rather than psychological injury or reduced motivation.
Thus, the social effects of bias are contingent on a number of
factors and will not be uniform amongst all societies, groups, and
historical eras.
Where harmful social effects will ensue from bias, given the
numbers and group characteristics, there is probably a case for
legally prohibiting biased choices in certain realms otherwise left to
private choice, particularly the economic realm. Apart from those
directed at the exceptionally morally vicious/virtuous or those
reflecting small group loyalties, biased choices are intrinsically
morally wrong. There is therefore less reason to believe there is a
moral right to make biased choices when they produce harmful
consequences, even within a framework that meets the minimum
standards of justice. Although attempting to extirpate all such
immoral biased choices through law would be too costly and could
violate moral rights, as in the case of prohibiting a choice of spouse
based on bias, the adverse consequences of prohibiting biased
economic choices by law might be worth the benefits of eliminating
the various costs of biased economic choices. Of course, in practice
it will be very difficult to distinguish immorally biased economic
choices from choices that are not immorally biased and not intrinsically wrong, such as choices to favor one's family or friends or
ethnic group members, or choices based on negative stereotypes.
Thus, it is best that we survey the other forms of discrimination
before reaching any conclusions, however tentative, about social

policy.
2. Preferences for Particular Types of People
as Reflections of Role Ideals
There is another category of preferences for and against types
of people distinct from, but easily confused with, bias on the one
hand, and stereotyping on the other. Some hold, as a moral ideal,
that people with a particular trait should perform certain tasks and
occupy certain social roles. The ideal cannot be based on a
judgment of differential moral worth, or it would be an instance of
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bias.13 Nor can the ideal be based on a presumed high statistical
correlation between the defining trait and some other trait that is
relevant to the task in question, or it would be an instance of
stereotype. 14 Moreover, the moral ideal on which the preferences
in question are based must be distinguished from other ideals that
produce preferences for particular types of people for particular
social roles and occupations, including aesthetic ideals (basketball
should be played only by people who are graceful or handsome as
well as skilled), and technical ideals (no one should practice law
without a good background in the liberal arts).
Perhaps the category of role preferences based on moral ideals
is a null set. Arguably, however, some people believe as a matter of
moral ideal that women and men should perform distinct social
roles. Such people do not believe that men and women have
differential moral worth. Nor do they believe that all women are
technically better suited for certain roles than all men, or that all
men are technically better suited for other roles than all women.
Rather, they believe that it is immoral for women to perform certain
roles and for men to perform certain roles. Although few people
believe gender matters morally for every social role, some believe
gender matters morally in child rearing and in sexuality. Thus,
many Americans view heterosexuality as the only morally proper
form of sexuality, and that the role of sex partner is gender-specific
as a matter of morality and not just as a matter of taste. 15 Arguably, these widespread beliefs about the morality of gender roles are
in many cases based not on biases or on stereotypes but on moral
ideals.
It is very difficult to reach any firm conclusions about discriminatory preferences based on moral ideals regarding roles. On the
one hand, these moral ideals often are offered by their proponents
without argument as self-evident or as religiously revealed truths,
and it is hard to know what arguments for such ideals would look
like. Those arguments for morally required roles which do emerge
in debates over gender usually take the form of arguments about
technical competence (women are better suited for child rearing),
or look suspiciously like aesthetic appeals. They do not take the
" See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
14See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
15 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that "majority

sentiments about the morality of homosexuality" are an adequate basis for criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
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form of moral arguments for gender-specific roles. 16 On the other
hand, I surely do not want to rule out the possibility of moral ideals
regarding roles. All moral arguments begin with unargued-for
premises.
Preferences based on moral ideals, if widespread, will be
experienced as oppressive by all individuals who reject the moral
ideals and their own role assignments thereunder. Moreover, they
will be seen as oppressive by those who reject the ideals, even if they
themselves are not consigned to unwanted roles, because of the
effects on others who mistakenly accept the ideals and role assignments that prevent them from realizing their full potential for
flourishing. If the ideals are mistaken, then the society in which
they are widespread will suffer the costs of failed self-realization and
lost productivity, even if that society does not perceive these as
costs, or perceives them as costs that are morally required.
3. Personal Aversions and Attractions to Particular
Types of People
Many people have aversions or attractions to particular types of
people, either categorically or in specific contexts. These aversions
and attractions are not biases because they are not based on
judgments of differential moral worth, though these aversions and
attractions may be rooted in ancient biases that now operate
subconsciously. Nor are these aversions and attractions based on
moral ideals or on stereotypes-those who have them do not believe
that the unwanted (or wanted) associations are morally forbidden
(or required), or that the target group likely has some other trait
that is straightforwardly relevant to the association-though these
aversions and attractions also may be rooted in moral ideals or in
stereotypes that now operate subconsciously. Finally, I am not here
concerned with aversions and attractions that are merely the
corollaries of small group ties.
16

These statements reveal my inability to grasp the sense of those "natural law"

moral arguments favored by, among others, the Catholic Church, which transform

biological functions into moral imperatives (e.g., sex is morally permissible only for
the purpose of procreation because that is its biological function). See Paul
Bromberg, Abortion and the Morality ofNurturance,21 CAN.J. PHIL. 513,521-24 (1991)
(placing the abortion debate in the framework of moral attitudes towards nurturance,
one of which is the conservative argument that a woman's primary moral duty is to
have and nurture children).
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Thus, some men may feel quite uncomfortable transacting
corporate business with women without consciously believing that
women are morally inferior to men, that women (morally) do not
belong in corporate boardrooms, or that women are technically
unqualified to handle corporate matters. Some women may feel
quite uncomfortable with a male gynecologist without believing that
males cannot or should not be gynecologists. These aversions and
attractions are probably not central to the identities of those who
have them, but often they may be rather deep-seated psychologically. Some may be traceable to biological hardwiring. Others are
most likely the products of biases, ideals, and stereotypes that have
become buried in the subconscious: they will tend, if widespread,
to reinforce conscious biases, ideals, and stereotypes, and to be
experienced by their victims in the same way the victims experience
conscious biases, ideals, and stereotypes. 17 If they are uniform, so
that the same groups tend to be preferred and dispreferred, and
widespread, and if they relegate the dispreferred to less desirable
positions in the socioeconomic hierarchy, their social effects may be
quite devastating. If they are idiosyncratic and variable, uncommon,
or context-specific-"I'm uncomfortable around Italians in my
private club but not at work"-rather than categorical-"I prefer to
avoid Jews in all contexts"-and do not disprefer the already
relatively disadvantaged, their adverse social effects may be
relatively minimal.
Aversions and attractions based on race, ethnicity, or gender are
only part of this category of preferences for and against certain types
of people. More common perhaps are aversions and attractions
based on aesthetics-how others look, sound, or even smell. Physical
appearance is a frequent basis for preferences, either categorically
("I want to be around handsome people in all contexts") or in
particular contexts ("I hire only good looking dancers for my
troupe"). Although aversions and attractions based on physical
attractiveness are common, they usually neither derive from nor
reinforce biases, ideals, or stereotypes. Nor are these preferences
so strong and widespread that those of us who are not stunningly
17 1 attend to the moral status of aversions and attractions based on unconscious
biases, a most difficult issue, below. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.b; see also Charles
R. Lawrence, III, The 1d, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious

Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (explaining the origins and effects of
unconscious racism).
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beautiful are seriously affected by them, unless, of course, we pursue
18
those careers that place a premium on looks.
B. TransitionalCases Between Preferences For and Against Particular
Types of People and Preferencesfor Specific Goods
and Services: Proxies and Reactions
1.

Discrimination Based on Proxy Traits and Stereotypes

Day in and day out, in almost every context, we react to people

based on traits they possess which, though immaterial in themselves,
we believe to be highly correlated with those traits in which we are
primarily interested. We are always using some traits as proxies for
other traits. In conclusively presuming for purposes of a particular
decision that an individual with a proxy trait possesses the material
trait, we stereotype those with the proxy trait.
We could not function without proxies and the stereotypes on
which they are based. Proxy traits are not only those traits that
correlate with the technical skills required for a particular task, such
as having outstanding academic credentials and being qualified for
a faculty position at a law school, or, negatively, being female and
being unable to play in the National Football League. Proxy traits
include all traits that correlate highly or are believed to correlate
highly with the traits material to a particular decision. If I conclude
that, because a neighborhood is black and poor, I, as a white driver,
ought to keep my windows up and doors locked, I am making a
proxy decision. If I decide not to hire a young woman because I
think it likely that she will quit work soon to have children, or that,
given social realities, she is likely to follow her husband if his job is
transferred, I am making a proxy decision. If I assume that most of
the older people in a Wyoming ranching town restaurant are
Republicans and act on that assumption without further investigation, I am making a proxy decision. If I decide not to look for
potential employees in locations where I predict the cost of interviewing them exceeds the probability times the extra benefit of
finding the most skilled persons at those locations, I am making a
proxy decision. If I decide not to date women who are not college18 Physical attractiveness does give its possessors some competitive advantage in
the job market, and physically attractive women are especially advantaged relative to
homely women. The deformed and grotesque no doubt suffer severe disadvantages.
See Note, FacialDiscrimination: ExtendingHandicapLaw to Employment Discrimination
on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2036-42 (1987).
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educated because it is unlikely that they and I will have much in
common, I am making a proxy decision.
The list is endless, the contexts ubiquitous. Indeed, sometimes
the trait we think is the material trait for which another trait is a
proxy turns out, on reflection, to be a proxy trait for the truly
material trait. Thus, certain credentials might be used by an
employer as proxies for relevant technical skills, but the skills
themselves are only proxies for the ability to increase the employer's
wealth, an ability which an employee without the best technical skills
might actually possess to a greater degree. Indeed, even the increase
in wealth is probably but a proxy for, as well as a means to, an
increase in happiness, which the employer might realize to a greater
extent were she surrounded by a less productive but more congenial
staff.
Proxies correlate with the traits for which they are proxies in
three significant ways. First, they may correlate through the laws of
nature. Women live longer than men, due in part to biological
differences between men and women; being female is thus a proxy
for greater longevity for those who set life insurance premiums.
Being black correlates highly with certain diseases (e.g., sickle cell
anemia) because of biology, and being white correlates highly with
others (e.g., skin cancer). Discrimination based upon laws-of-nature
proxies may be quite rational because it is cost-justified, even in
cases where the correlation between the proxy trait and the material
trait is only slightly positive. The cost justification of such proxies
is a function of the strength of the correlation and the costs and the
improvement of correlation attributable to alternatives to the proxy.
The second significant way in which proxies correlate with their
material traits is through the "laws" of human personality and
culture: the predicted behavior of persons with the proxy traits.
This is the realm not of the laws of physical nature but of psychological and sociological generalizations and predictions. Thus, the
employer who fears that a woman is more likely to quit her job than
a man because of the desire to have children or the desire to
accommodate a spouse's career is drawing upon the sociological
generalizations that women in our culture are more likely to engage
in childcare functions and more likely to sacrifice their careers for
their spouses' than men. These generalizations, though not based
on invariant physical laws, may be as or more accurate and confidence-inspiring than physical generalizations. For example, auto
insurance companies predict the highway mortality and collision
figures for particular groups of drivers with uncanny accuracy
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despite the fact that there are no laws of nature compelling speeding, intoxication, or most of the other behavior in question. It is this
second category of correlations between proxies and material traits
that most people find problematic. This category often evokes the
pejorative use of "stereotype" ("Jews are pushy," "blacks are lazy,"
"women are overly emotional," "whites have no 'soul,'" etc.). This
category is frequently labelled "guilt by association" ("Even if most
women do quit their jobs to have children, I am not going to quit";
"the police should notjudge me by my long hair, my VW van emblazoned with daisies, and my guitar, even if most people with long
hair, VW vans emblazoned with daisies, and guitars are carrying
drugs;" etc.).
The third category of correlation between proxies and material
traits results from a prediction of how others will react to those with
the proxy traits. For example, black police may be no more skilled
in policing the ghetto than white police, except that we can predict
that the black residents will communicate more openly with the black
police and thereby make them more effective than white police.
Similarly, male gynecologists may be less effective than female
gynecologists of equal technical ability because the patients are more
comfortable with the female gynecologists.
These "reaction
qualifications" are the subject of the next section, so I shall defer any
further discussion of them until then.
Proxy discrimination and the stereotypes on which it is based is
usually as unproblematic as it is commonplace. Proxy discrimination
is quite frequently rational because the underlying stereotypes or
generalizations are fairly accurate. Society could not function very
well if our generalizations about other people were too frequently
inaccurate. Nevertheless, proxy discrimination can be morally
troublesome in three ways.
First, irrational proxy discrimination, based upon inaccurate
stereotypes or generalizations, is morally troublesome because it
imposes unnecessary social costs. So, for the same reason, is proxy
discrimination that is irrational, not because it is based on inaccurate
stereotypes or generalizations, but because there are more cost!
benefit-justified alternative proxies available. Both types of irrational
proxy discrimination represent preferences premised on factual
errors. And if significant social costs accompany irrational proxy dis19
crimination, it may be morally wrong to engage in it.
19 For various reasons, however, there may be moral rights not to have all morally
wrong proxy discrimination legally proscribed. See discussion infra Part III.D.I.
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Proxy discrimination which is based on accurate generalizations
and which is cost/benefit-justified relative to alternative choices
exemplifies instrumental rationality. One might think, therefore,
that proxy discrimination that is not cost/benefit-justified because
it is based on inaccurate stereotypes and generalizations, or because
better proxies are available, would not be a major social problem.
After all, an instrumentally irrational proxy hurts its user, who then
has every reason to switch to more rational proxies once they are
discovered. Irrational proxies are a social problem, however,
because many of them represent displaced biases. One who realizes
that his biases cannot be justified on their own terms, such as one
who realizes the invalidity of his judgment that blacks are inherently
morally inferior, may, rather than relinquish the judgment fully,
merely replace it with a belief that blacks very frequently have trait
X, trait X being a perfectly respectable basis for discrimination.
Thus, many irrational proxies are the products of bias-driven tastes
for certain erroneous beliefs. 20 For that reason, the erroneous
beliefs underlying irrational proxies, and thus the irrational proxies
themselves, being taste- rather than evidence-based, will often prove
to be both impervious to contradictory evidence and incorrigible.
This is true especially when the costs of error are not very high for
the stereotyper. Like the unconscious biases on which they are
based, irrational stereotyping and proxy discrimination will be much
harder to eliminate through education, at least among those without
ample alternative sources of relative self-esteem.
The third troublesome type of proxy discrimination consists of
that proxy discrimination that, though based on accurate stereotypes
or generalizations, and though cost/benefit-justified, nonetheless has
undesirable social consequences. Proxy discrimination based on
accurate predictions of the choices of the dispreferred tends to
perpetuate the social realities that make the predictions accurate.
For example, if women are allowed to drink at an earlier age than
men because they are generally more responsible drinkers, men
might be reinforced in the attitudes that foster their relative
irresponsibility. Similarly, if blacks are dispreferred in employment
because the employer has reliable statistics showing that blacks are
somewhat more likely than whites to malinger on the job, or to
engage in petty theft from the employer, the attitudes that spawn
those predicted behaviors might be reinforced. 21 Even stereotypes
20 For excellent discussions of stereotyping resulting from unconscious biases, see
TAJFEL, supra note 2, at 143-61; Lawrence, supra note 17, at 331-39.
21 It is frequently noted that proxy discrimination in employment based on
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based on physical laws, such as those relating to life expectancy or
susceptibility to various types of illnesses may cause resentment and
may reinforce biases and other inaccurate stereotypes. Stereotypes
based on psychological and sociological predictions, however, usually
prove troublesome even when accurate and otherwise rational.
Individuals most likely will resent these stereotypes and view them
as insulting and stigmatic ("guilt by association"), especially when
these judgments support a conclusion that reflects negatively on
moral worth. The same experience may result even when these
stereotypes support a morally neutral conclusion which nevertheless
disadvantages those whose behavior is predicted. 22 Moreover,

accurate and currently cost-justified stereotypes may result in those with the
dispreferred proxy traits underinvesting in their human capital if the proxy traits are
difficult to change, given that they, as individuals, face collective action problems in
changing the general behaviors that make the stereotypes accurate. See Mark Kelman,
Concepts ofDiscriminationin GeneralAbility "JobTesting, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 116061, 1232-33 (1991); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of RacialDiscrimination
in Employment: The Casefor Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1626-27 (1991).
Related to this point is that a proxy discrimination that is based on a currently
accurate stereotype that is currently cost-justified may not be dynamically cost-justified:
forgoing the use of the proxy, may entail losses in the short term, but may bring about
changes in behavior that produce long-term gains that offset the short-term losses.
See Kelman, supra, at 1160-61; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop
Discrimination,8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 22, 29, 31 (1991). As Sunstein notes:
[I]f there is prejudice and statistical discrimination, and if third parties
promote discrimination, there will be decreased investments in human
capital. Such decreased investments will be a perfectly reasonable response
to the real world. And if there are decreased investments in human capital,
then prejudice, statistical discrimination, and third-party effects will also increase. Statistical discrimination will become all the more rational; prejudice
will hardly be broken down; consumers and employers will be more likely
to be discriminators.
Id. at 31.
Of course, forgoing the use of a good proxy may be dynamically rational socially
but not individually, especially where the long term is very long or the short-term
losses are quite severe or maldistributed.
22 Stereotypes that support proxy judgments about moral worth-e.g., "people with
trait X tend to act immorally or criminally'---not only cause resentment among those
people with trait X who do not fit the stereotype, but also tend to produce the very
immoral or criminal behavior that justifies the stereotype. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 279-81 (1989). The problematic
status of proxy decision-making based on such stereotypes may help explain the
controversy over statistical methods ofproof in civil and criminal trials. See, e.g.,Judith
J. Thomson, Liability and IndividualizedEvidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1986, at 199 (criticizing decisions based on statistical evidence and proposing instead
the use of individualized evidence); cf. Richard Schmalbeck, The Trouble with Statistical
Evidence, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 221 (noting a distrust of
statistical evidence but recognizing its value if analyzed carefully).
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beyond resentment, and beyond the freezing of the underlying social
reality mentioned above, such accurate stereotypes may reinforce
biases and other inaccurate stereotypes to a much greater extent
than stereotypes based on physical laws.
Nonetheless, in assessing whether there is a moral right to make
a rational proxy discrimination based on accurate stereotypes, one
must always be aware that this discrimination is rational from the
discriminator's standpoint. If there are social costs associated with
accurate stereotypes in some instances, there are at the same time,
individual costs associated with a moral injunction against their use.
There is reason to doubt the truth of moral propositions that
demand considerable individual sacrifice for the social good.23
Although the discriminator and those who bear the costs of
discrimination are protected by my assumption of ajust framework,
even within the framework, and surely in setting its boundaries, we
should not expect isolated individuals to make considerable sacrifices
merely to avoid a greater social cost. Even within an otherwise just
framework, social costs should be borne equitably. Of course, the
social cost of rational proxy discrimination is simply the aggregation
of costs to individuals. Quite frequently, however, the cost to the
proxy discriminator of forgoing the use of the proxy will be much
greater than the cost any particular individual will bear as a result
24
of proxy discrimination.
This discussion of the morality of proxy discrimination carries
even more force when applied to the legal proscription of proxy
discrimination. Given that proxy discrimination reflects a rational
attempt to satisfy unbiased and otherwise morally proper preferences, it will be difficult to suppress legally. Moreover, attempts at legal
23 See KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS 20304 (1958); GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ETHICS 157-62 (1977); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMiTs OF PHILOSOPHY
77 (1985). But see SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 386-403 (1989) (arguing

that moral demands may be quite severe and discussing the value of being moral and
accepting morality's challenges); Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialismy, and the

Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134, 160-63 (1984) (suggesting that altering
social and political structures can lead to decreased disruption in life presently
engendered by quite far-reaching moral demands).

24 Contrast the potential costs to those individuals barred from making a rational
proxy judgment that a certain neighborhood is a high-crime one with the potential
costs to those persons victimized by thatjudgment-those with no criminal tendencies
whom the discriminators will take special precautions around or avoid entirely. For
a hardheaded look at such proxy judgments, see Michael Levin, Responses to Race
Differences in Crime, 23J. Soc. PHIL. 5 (1992).
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suppression will likely stimulate the invention and use of more
ingenious proxies that correlate highly with the forbidden proxies.
2. Reaction Qualifications
Frequently, and particularly when choosing whom to employ for
specific jobs, we discriminate on the basis of "reaction qualifications"
in addition to technical qualifications. Alan Wertheimer defines
reaction qualifications as "those abilities or characteristics which
contribute to job effectiveness by causing or serving as the basis of
the appropriate reaction in the recipients. Technical qualifications
refer to all other qualifications (of an ordinary sort)."2 5 Wertheimer proceeds to offer some examples of discrimination that are based
on reaction qualifications:
(1) An elementary school principal must choose S or T to teach
first grade. S has superior pedagogical skills but has a thick foreign
accent which six-year-olds find odd and difficult to understand.
The children will actually learn more from T. (2) A high school
principal must choose U or V to teach a ninth-grade class with
serious discipline problems. Whereas U is better trained, he is
short and has a high-pitched voice. V is tall, muscular, and has a
deep authoritative voice. For this reason, V will have fewer
discipline problems and will elicit more learning. (3) An advertising agency must choose Y or Z to model swimwear. Although
Y's posing technique is superior, Z has the physical attributes (tall,
thin, small bustline) which make this swimwear appear more
attractive. (4) A university health service must choose M (male) or
F (female) as a staff gynecologist. M is a superior diagnostician,
but many female students feel more at ease with a female gynecologist, will respond better to a female's advice, and will not seek
needed medical care from a male physician. There will, therefore,
be fewer medical problems if F is chosen. (5) A shoe store owner
must choose B (black) or W (white) as a salesman. B can fit shoes
better, but because many customers are hostile to blacks, W will sell
more shoes. (6) An appliance store owner must choose H or L as
a salesman. H has superior knowledge of appliances but has an
aggressive hard-sell personality. L is low-key, and customers in this
region (although not in all regions) will buy more from low-key
salesmen.

2

26

26

Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 100.

Id. at 100-01. I have omitted Wertheimer's seventh example, choosing a lefthanded pitcher to face a predominantly left-handed batting order, because the relevant
reaction is arguably not psychological but physical or perceptual.
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To Wertheimer's list I would add: (7) B, a black police officer,
would like to be assigned to a rural beat, and W, a white police
officer, would like to be assigned to the inner city. The department
concludes, however, that because of anti-black biases, stereotypes,
and aversions among rural whites, W would be more effective than
B on the rural beat, and that because of widespread fear of or
discomfort around white cops among inner city blacks, B would be
more effective than W on the inner city beat. (8) 0 is a white
professional basketball player-the only white on his team-who has
been a fan favorite for many years. He is now past his prime and
inferior in skill to some black candidates for the squad. Because
management believes that the warmth the fans feel toward 0 plus
their possible antipathy toward a team that has no white players add
up to higher gate receipts if 0 is kept on the team, even at the cost
of a somewhat worse record, O's contract is renewed. (This last
example illustrates not only a reaction qualification, but also the
point that skills in business are usually just proxies for making
money for the employer.)
After giving his examples of reaction qualifications, Wertheimer
continues:
Several observations can now be made. First, it is clear that
reaction qualifications are crucial to a wide variety ofjobs. Indeed,
the entire point of many jobs is to elicit the appropriate reaction.
This is true, in part, because many jobs in a modern society involve
some form of interpersonal relations-advising, ordering, teaching,
selling....
Second, many questions concerning reaction qualifications are
essentially empirical: What are the reaction tendencies of the
relevant recipients? How do they come about? Can they be
changed? Reaction tendencies do clearly vary according to factors
such as race, sex, age, class, and region. And whatever their causal
basis, at least some reaction tendencies can no doubt be changed
by deliberate social action. That said, the reaction tendencies of
the relevant recipients are what they are. And they are crucial to
job effectiveness. The fact that those tendencies could be different
and/or changed should not cause us to deny the present facts or
to overestimate their malleability. Some reaction tendencies may
be deeply rooted in general developmental patterns or changeable
only at great social or individual costs.
Third, to say that recipients' reactions are relevant to job
effectiveness is not to say that the employee's actions are irrelevant.
Some reaction qualifications do stem from a reaction to a passive
characteristic of the employee (e.g., race), but others are elicited
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by an employee's actions. It is important to note here that what
counts as a technical ability for many jobs is often determined
by
27
and cannot be abstracted from the relevant reactions.
If we take the reactions as given, either because we cannot affect
them, at least in the short term, or because we do not believe we
should, how should we assess the morality of considering reaction
qualifications? Wertheimer argues that reaction qualifications should
not be discounted merely because the relevant reactions are based
on immutable or passive characteristics, or because the reactions are
non-rational.28 On the other hand, reactions that are based on
judgments of differential moral worth or inaccurate stereotypes are
more appropriately discounted.2 9 Wertheimer would also be less
prone to discount a reaction that is psychologically deep-seated, or
that is a personal preference for one's own group's members by a
member of a previously victimized group. 0 In short, those reactions tend to be most discountable which express intrinsically
immoral preferences, such as those reflecting biases and inaccurate
stereotypes. Other reactions should not be discounted."1
It would be tempting, and analytically tidy, to conclude that the
morality of considering reaction qualifications follows straightforwardly from the morality of the reaction preferences themselves.
Thus, if a reaction preference were intrinsically immoral because
based on a judgment of moral inferiority or on an inaccurate
stereotype, considering the reaction as a qualification would itself
be immoral. Additionally, if a reaction preference, though not
intrinsically immoral, had the kinds of devastating psychological and
social effects that would support a conclusion that the preference
was immoral, considering the reaction as a qualification would again
itself be immoral.
Things are not so tidy, however. First, many otherwise immoral
reaction preferences are preferences of individuals who are not fully
morally responsible. For example, a bias, aversion, or stereotype
held by children that would be immoral if held by an adult may
nonetheless substantially impair children's education if not taken
into account in hiring teachers. And children cannot be deemed
morally responsible for their failure to learn.
2

7 Id. at 101-02.

28

See id. at 102-03.

29 See id. at 107-08.
so See id.
S See id.
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Moreover, and more importantly, if we decide we cannot or
should not affect the reactions themselves, even though they are
immoral, then failure to count the reactions as qualifications will
frequently impose costs on parties other than the immoral reactors.
For example, failure to assign a black police officer to an inner city
beat, where community reaction may make her more effective than
a white officer, may result in a higher level of crime, crime that
victimizes many persons who do not themselves react to the skin
color of police officers.
Thus, even when the reactions are immoral, treating those
reactions as qualifications may not be. Indeed, sometimes disregarding immoral reactions may itself be immoral. My tentative
conclusion is that the morality of one's treatment of reaction
qualifications is not primarily a function of the intrinsic morality or
immorality of the reactions. Rather, the morality of the chosen
treatment is primarily a function of both considering the gravity and
the distribution of the social effects of acknowledging reaction
qualifications and the gravity and distribution of the social effects
32
of not acknowledging them.
C. Preferencesfor Goods, Services, and PersonalRelations
That Entail Preferencesfor ParticularKinds of People
I began my survey of discriminatory preferences with primary
preferences for and against certain people. I then moved to
secondary preferences for and against certain people based on proxy
or reaction qualification considerations. These preferences, though
not primary, were intermediate between preferences for goods and
services and primary preferences for and against certain kinds of
people. The proxy relationship or the reaction qualification
frequently reflected or reinforced primary preferences for and
against certain kinds of people. I now move to preferences purely
for goods, services, and personal relations that nonetheless entail
preferences for and against certain kinds of people.

By far the most common type of discriminatory preference is the
preference for people with traits that are technical qualifications for
12 To the limited extent that the morality of counting reaction qualifications
depends upon the intrinsic morality/immorality of the reactions, it is because it is less
problematic to expect the reactors to give up intrinsically immoral preferences than
it is to expect them to give up intrinsically benign ones. I owe this point to Ken
Greenawalt. Letter from Ken Greenawalt to Larry Alexander (Nov. 1991) (on file with
the author).

1992]

WHATMAKES WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 177

specific tasks and relationships. This type of preference views the
traits in question not as primarily valuable in themselves, but
valuable as means to production, entertainment, and other ends. If
we enjoy good basketball, then we value-in that context-those
people with the traits conducive to playing good basketball. If we
value skilled neurosurgery, then we value-again, in that context-the
people with the traits conducive to skilled neurosurgery. If we value
good but inexpensive widgets, then we value those who are most
efficient at producing them. If we value humor in a companion,
then we seek as companions those who possess a good sense of
humor.

In any large, technologically advanced society that has a sizable
realm of individual freedom, including market freedom, there exists
a numerous and diverse set of esteemed traits and skills. Many who
rank high on one scale of esteem will rank low on others, and vice
versa. Skilled neurosurgeons may make lots of money but may not
be valued highly as companions because of dour personalities.
Unskilled workers may be great companions. Nonetheless, it would
be naive to assume that equally esteemed traits and skills are
distributed in such a way that everyone scores as well as everyone
else when the scores on the scales measuring these traits and skills
are summed. And of course, with respect to traits and skills that are
the subjects of economic reward, a free market clearly does not
distribute monetary rewards equally.
Should we be troubled by discrimination and inequality that
follows from free choices in the economy and elsewhere? Recall that
I am prescinding the moral analysis of discrimination from other
matters of social justice such as whether there is a just distribution
of wealth. Recall also that I am assuming that having a large realm
of freedom, including a substantially free market, is not per se
inconsistent with justice. Is there something about certain distributions of differential esteem and inequalities of material reward that
is morally problematic when similar distributions along different axes
would not be morally problematic?
For purposes of analysis, I am going to break the category of
preferences for goods, services, and relationships into two subcategories: preferences that are "tainted" by associations with biases,
stereotypes, and dubious ideologies; and preferences that are
completely untainted by such associations. The former is more
closely connected with the preferences I have already considered, so
I shall address it first. The latter is at the opposite end of the
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preferences spectrum from the biases with which I began, so I shall
address it last.
1. Preferences for Goods, Services, and Personal Relations Tainted
by Associations with Biases, Stereotypes, and Ideologies
a. Generally

Many of our preferences for goods, services, occupations, and
the like can be traced historically to biases, stereotypes, ideologies,
and other dubious tribalisms and to the social structures to which
they gave rise. For example, our taste for certain types of music
such as "the blues" may be traceable to the structures and attitudes
of the Jim Crow era. Similarly, our standards for what counts as
female beauty for purposes of beauty pageants and selecting models
and starlets may reflect a preference for Caucasian characteristics
traceable to racial animosities and pride. Our preference for
distinctive men's and women's clothing fashions rather than unisex
fashions, a preference that in turn makes women more technically
(as well as reactively) qualified to model women's fashions and men
more technically (and reactively) qualified to model men's fashions,
may be rooted in gender ideology. Male aversions to becoming
secretaries ("women's work") and female aversions to certain "male"
occupations are commonplace and obvious examples of this type of
preference. 33 Many other preferences which seem on their face to
be unrelated to these tribalisms, however, may in fact be related.
We may prefer steeply pitched roofs in houses because of long
forgotten associations with particular religious sects and their
churches. We may prefer certain sports because of connections with
past ideologies now buried in the collective subconscious.
These "tainted" preferences will vary considerably in terms of
how strong, how deeply rooted, and how autonomous from their
tainted origins they now are. Moreover, the discrimination now
brought about by such preferences will not necessarily parallel past
discrimination or reflect the normative hierarchy that gave rise to
it. Although black models may be relatively disadvantaged by
"white" standards of beauty, the male aversion to "women's work"
tends to raise the relative wages of secretaries (predominantly
3 There is a burgeoning body of feminist literature focusing on "genderized
preferences." See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1279, 1284-85 (1987).
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females) and depress the relative wages of construction workers

(predominantly males). Although black musicians may find it much
harder psychologically than white musicians to fulfill requests for
"Dixie," they may find it relatively easier to satisfy white audiences'
tastes for jazz and rhythm and blues. The point here is not empirical, but conceptual: the impact of a tainted preference is logically
independent of the impact of those past preferences that make it
"tainted."
Should anyone feel aggrieved by being disfavored for ajob or
some other benefit because of a preference or taste whose historical
origin is some immoral bias, ideology, or social condition? If we
currently value jazz and those who play it well, does it matter that,
but for past racism, we would not have such a taste? Should we feel
guilty that our standards of human beauty are almost certainly tribal
and not universal? Should our attitude towards secretaries' salaries
be affected by the knowledge that, but for a now widely discredited
ideology of gender roles, secretaries' salaries might well be lower (or
higher, if male aversions are more than offset by female preferences)? Although some of these "tainted" preferences might be quite
discrete, quite shallow psychologically, and quite malleable, most will
be difficult to identify, to disconnect from other preferences, and
to excise. Moreover, because the tainted preferences do not necessarily produce current discrimination that tracks the immoral discrimination that provides the "taint," it is difficult to see how these
preferences and the discrimination to which they give rise are
morally distinct from untainted preferences and the discrimination
to which they give rise.

b. The Special Case of UnconsciousBias
Before turning to ordinary, untainted preferences and the
discrimination they produce, I want to discuss separately one special
category of tainted preferences: preferences reflecting currently
operative but unconscious biases. The category has come under
discussion recently in connection with the Supreme Court's
requirement that racially discriminatory intent be proved to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause. s4 My concern with
34 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). For a discussion of the
relation of unconscious bias to the Court's discriminatory intent standard, see
Lawrence, supra note 17; David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 935, 960-62 (1989).
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unconscious biases is, of course, different. I want to ask if such
biases, or rather the tainted preferences by which they are manifested, have the same moral status as preferences reflecting conscious
biases, or whether instead the unconsciousness of the biases makes
such preferences morally no different from other tainted preferences
that have become autonomous from their tainted origins.
The type of preference I am concerned with is one that disproportionately negatively affects members of a particular group but,
at a conscious level, is neutral with respect to that group. Nonetheless, the preference is anything but neutral, for it will be abandoned
in favor of other "neutral" preferences that negatively affect the
group if and when it ceases to hurt and begins to benefit the group
in question. The explanation for this dynamic is that the discrimina35
tor is biased against the group, though the bias is unconscious.
For example, someone might be an avid Boston Celtics fan when
the team is predominantly white. When blacks come to dominate
the team in terms of numbers, the fan finds that he just cannot get
excited about the Celtics any more, and he switches his interest to
the all-white Boston Bruins hockey team. He does not attribute this
change in preference to racial bias, for he does not believe he is
biased and rejects all biased judgments at the conscious level. He
is, however, unconsciously biased, which means that if the Celtics
became predominantly white again, or if the Bruins became
predominantly black, his allegiances would shift back to the
36
Celtics.
As thus described, unconscious biases are best thought of as
8
dispositions,37 unaccompanied by conscious biased judgments,3
to prefer and disprefer particular goods, services, and people whenand because-such preferences have certain disproportionate group
impacts. What shall we say about their moral status?
35 What I have to say about unconscious biases fully applies to unconscious
stereotypes that, were they conscious, would produce irrational discrimination because
of their degree of inaccuracy and the availability of superior proxies. See supra text
accompanying note 19.
M For other examples of preferences reflecting unconscious biases, see Lawrence,
supra note 17, at 348-49.
37 See MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY:

RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP

322-42 (1984).
" I realize that much, much more can be said about the phenomenology of bias
and stereotype-driven discrimination and the roles that judgments regarding moral
worth and likely character-istics play in discriminatory actions, a realization based
largely upon conversations with Ken Simons. Interviews with Ken Simons, Professor
of Law, Boston University School of Law, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 1991).
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The case for treating unconscious biases as morally equivalent
to conscious biases and unlike other tainted preferences is surely a
weighty one. The preferences of the unconsciously biased are not
simply tainted because of their origins. Unlike tainted preferences
which have become autonomous from their tainted origins, the
preferences of the unconsciously biased track the preferences of
those who are consciously biased. Dispreferred individuals will likely
find them just as stigmatic and insulting as consciously biased
preferences.3 9 Moreover, such preferences should be relatively
shallow psychologically, because they rest on biases that are rejected
at the conscious level. Once made aware of their unconscious biases,
the discriminators are quite likely to abandon the tainted
preferences.
Despite the strength of the case for treating unconscious biases
as on a moral par with conscious biases, I am unable to reach any
firm conclusion on the matter, for there is also a case for treating
unconscious biases no differently from other tainted preferences and
thus-if one accepts my conclusion about tainted preferences-no
differently from ordinary preferences that have disproportionate
group impact. First, it is not clear that a preference, as opposed to
ajudgment, can be morally defamatory. That I prefer basketball to
football does not imply that I regard those who play football as
inferior human beings. Preferences do imply value judgments-that
what is preferred is of greater value to the preferrer than alternatives-but not all such value judgments are capable of universalization. That I regard something as valuable does not mean that I
regard it as valuable to you, even if I accept that value judgments are
objective and that values are grounded in reality. The preferences

of the unconsciously biased, qua preferences, do not automatically
entail defamatory judgments about moral worth.
More significantly, it is not at all certain that one who becomes
aware that a preference structure reflects unconscious biases he
consciously disavows has any reason to and thus can be predicted to
give up the preference structure. The Bruins fan, when made aware
of the unconscious racism that has caused him to prefer hockey to
basketball, may still find that he prefers hockey to basketball. There
has been a great deal written about the morality of satisfying
preferences that are "inauthentic," adaptive to an immoral reality,
40
or the products of conditioning to accept an incorrect ideology.
39
40 See Lawrence, supra note 17, at 352-54.
See RIcHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RGHT 88-129 (1979);
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These discussions tend to assume-incorrectly, I believe-that
"cognitive psychotherapy" will cause us to reject those preferences
41
of ours that are traceable to such morally problematic causes.
This premise may be true where the preferences rest entirely on
incorrect or questionable beliefs that are now exposed as such, as
when a special preference or aversion rests upon an incorrect belief
implanted in childhood. Nevertheless, it is more dubious in the
cases considered here, where the bias against blacks is consistent
with preferring many things besides hockey. In other words, the bias
explains why hockey was eligible for preference, relative to basketball, but it does not explain why hockey is preferred over other
sports dominated by whites.
My tentative conclusion is that when unconscious biases result
in personal aversions-where what is dispreferred is no more than
association with the group targeted by the unconsciously biased
discrimination-the aversion has the same moral status as a conscious
bias. 4 2 It will be experienced by the dispreferred as they would
experience conscious bias. Furthermore, it should be easy to
extirpate once its source in unconscious bias is exposed, because the
bias itself is consciously rejected, and because the bias fully determines the aversion.
On the other hand, when the preference stemming from unconscious bias is for some good or service and is not merely an aversion
to certain people, my weak intuition is to treat it like other tainted
preferences and thus like ordinary preferences. The only difference
between preferences reflecting unconscious biases and other tainted
preferences is that the tainted attitudes are still active in the former
case. Although active, they are nevertheless unconscious, and that
is significant: unconscious "judgments" are judgments in only an

JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 43-66 (1983); DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND
PERSONAL CHOICE 59-75 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1152-58 (1986).
41 See BRANDT, supra note 40, at 11. There is a growing body of philosophical
literature on second-order preferences, or preferences about preferences, the
progenitor of which is Harry G. Frankfurt's Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68J. PHIL. 5 (1971). See also Paul Benson, Autonomy and OppresiveSocialization,
17 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 385,391-94 (1991) (considering Frankfurt's analysis of higher
order desires with respect to the oppressive socialization of women);John Christman,
Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self, 25 S.J. PHIL. 281, 283-90 (1987) (analyzing
higher and lower order desire theory of autonomy, including criticism and defenses);
Thomas E. Moody, Liberal Conceptionsofthe Self andAutonomy, in FREEDOM, EQUALITY,
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 94, 94-98 (Creighton Peden & James P. Sterba eds., 1989)
(analyzing Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of autonomy).
42 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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extended metaphorical sense. It is also not clear that one can be
morally defamed by such a behavioral disposition any more than one
can be defamed by a robot programmed to act as if it loathes you.
In addition, unconscious biases underdetermine the preferences that
manifest them. While we can say that the bias itself is wrong, we
cannot say the same of the preferences. We can attempt to make
unconscious biases conscious with the hope of eradicating them; but
the preferences might very well persist long after the bias disappears.
2. Preferences for Goods, Services, and Relations That
Differentially Affect Various Groups
Our preferences for particular goods, services, and relations and
the finitude of our resources mean that, given a realm of freedom
in a society of sufficient size and technological attainment, some
people will command higher salaries, will be more esteemed, and will
have more satisfying lives than others. Our preference for NBA
basketball over archery means that those with the skills required for
NBA basketball will be financially better off than skilled archers. I
may be the only person in the United States capable of making a
good sixteenth century lute; but if no one wants a good sixteenth
century lute, and if no one esteems the skills that go into making
one, I will neither be rewarded nor admired for my rare talent.
The inequalities of wealth and esteem produced by a realm of
freedom to express preferences lead to, of course, inequalities
amongJohn, Jane, Joe, andJoan. They can also be viewed, however,
as inequalities among groups. We are each members of an indefinite
number of groups. For example, I am a member of the following
groups: the American-born; males; Jews; persons under five feet
nine inches; persons over five feet seven inches; Californians; Padres
fans; lawyers; law professors; ex-Texans; persons over 135 pounds;
the blue-eyed; married persons; parents; fathers of one girl and two
boys; graduates of Eastern colleges; and so on, and so on. No matter
along what axis we group human beings, some of those groups will
fare better than others in terms of income, esteem, and satisfaction.

For example, the group "males" qua group has a higher per capita
income than the group "females."43 Within the group "women",
44
white women generally enjoy higher incomes than black women.
4

3 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

OF THE UNITED STATES 457 (1991) (table 736 showing that median money income of
year-round full-time workers in 1989 was $28,605 for men and $19,645 for women).
4See id. (showing that the median money income of year-round full-time female
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On the other hand, the group "ex-Texans", or "people under five
feet nine inches," may not be doing particularly well in relative
terms. Surely, Padres fans are currently not faring well.4 5
When it arises, not from group biases, ideals, ideologies,
aversions, reactions, or stereotypes, but solely as a product of
ordinary preferences for goods and services and the distribution of
skills, physical attributes, attitudes, ambitions, and so forth, does
inequality among any of these groups have any moral significance?
It is tempting, and perhaps correct, to argue that these group
inequalities-disparate group impacts-are of no moral import. Any
set of preferences produces inequalities between the relatively preferred and the relatively dispreferred. Therefore, why should we attribute any moral significance to some groups whose membership
correlates positively with the group consisting of all relatively
dispreferred individuals, when we don't attribute moral significance
to the group of relatively dispreferred individuals itself?. Put
differently, if there are ten individuals with different incomes, why
should we feel more morally troubled if the bottom five are
predominantly black and female and the top five are predominantly
white and male than if blacks and females are distributed more
evenly, especially if there is no present bias, inaccurate stereotyping,
and so forth? We have ten individuals with different incomes in
either case. Furthermore, are we not inappropriately reifying the
groups when we assume that they are affected by these inequalities
in some way apart from how individuals are affected qua individuals?

46

workers in 1989 was $19,873 for white women and $17,908 for black women).
45 The Padres finished the 1992 baseball season one game over .500 and barely
in third place in the National League Western Division. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992,
at B10 (table showing final National League standings).
46 See Michael E. Levin, Is RacialDiscriminationSpecial?, 15J. VALUE INQUIRY 225,
227-28 (1981); see also Walter E. Williams, False Civil Rights Vision and ContemptforRule
of Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1782 (1991). For examples of such group reification, see
Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Challenging
Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1401-14 (1988);
Martha T. McCluskey, Note, RethinkingEqualityand Difference: DisabilityDiscrimination
in PublicTransportation,97 YALE L.J. 863,878-80 (1988). Both authors treat economic
equality between men and women qua groups, but not equality among individuals or
among groups such as the skilled and unskilled, as a moral desideratum that can
trump efficiency, employer interests, etc. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor
Race-Consciousness,91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,1062-81, 1091-95 (1991); Mary E. Becker,
Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv. 201, 206-12; Sunstein, supra
note 21, at 33-36; Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies,79 CAL. L. REv. 751,
771-73 (1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies].

1992]

WHATMAKES WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 185

Two different reasons are given for the moral significance of the
disparate group impact of ordinary preferences. One points to the
present social consequences of disparate impact, and the other to
both those present social consequences and to past wrongs.
a. DisparateImpact and Present Social Consequences

Although we are each members of an indefinite number of
groups corresponding to the various characteristics we share with
some but not all other persons, it is a psychological and sociological
truth that membership in a few of those groups is more central to
our sense of who we are than membership in most of them. If I
personally am dispreferred for a particular job or as someone's
companion, I will feel the sting of personal rejection as well as the
loss of the opportunity denied. My personal preferences to have the
job, to be the companion, or to have esteemed traits will be
unsatisfied. Beyond my personal defeat, however, I will generally
be unconcerned with who in fact gets the positions and esteem I
sought. For example, I will be unconcerned with whether the job
I sought unsuccessfully was awarded to a white or to a black, to a
male or to a female, to ajew or to a Protestant, to a five foot eight
inch Padres fan or to a six foot three inch Dodgers fan.
On the other hand, there are people who are concerned with
how others within certain groups are faring. Many blacks care about
how other blacks are doing in the job market. If blacks as a group
are doing poorly relative to other racial groups, they feel bad
regardless of how they as individuals are doing.4 7 The same
attitude is true of many women towards women as a group, many
ethnic group members toward their ethnic group, and many religious
group members toward their religious group. And it is almost
universally true of the attitude we take toward our family and group
of close friends. Moreover, in a variety of contexts we have
preferences regarding group success with respect to groups of which
we are not members. For example, many whites take pleasure in the
success of blacks as a group; many men take pleasure in the success
of women as a group; and avid Padres fans live and die with the fate
of the team, and only derivatively with the fate of the fans.
Close identification with particular groups not only produces
these vicarious pleasures and pains, satisfactions and frustrations, but
also produces subtle and not so subtle effects on aspirations and
47 See Kelman, supra note 21, at 1240-43; Strauss, supra note 21, at 1629-30.
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motivations. Blacks' identification with other blacks, coupled with
the disproportionately high number of successful black athletes and
the disproportionately low number of successful black academics,
may result in a disproportionate number of young blacks striving to
become athletes rather than academics. Similarly, women may opt

for childbearing over corporate management because they identify
with other women and see so few in the latter role and so many in
the former. 48 Finally, group consciousness produces political
demands on behalf of the groups that exhibit this phenomenon.
These demands are in turn a source of social strife and costs
regardless of their moral legitimacy.
There are a number of questions regarding the moral significance of these costs occasioned by disparate group impact. First, are
they different in kind or in legitimacy from extreme individual
reactions to being dispreferred? ("If you don't hire me for this job,
I'll kill myself, I'll incite a riot, I'll be psychologically crippled, etc.")
Second, should failure to satisfy the external preference for how
others are treated 49 be viewed as a cost of satisfying ordinary
preferences for purposes of morally assessing the satisfaction of
those ordinary preferences? Third, are these social costs of the
disparate group impact of ordinary preferences properly regarded
as costs of the preferences, or are they properly regarded as costs
of the underlying biases, aversions, commitments, and stereotypes
that lead to the group identifications?" 0
There is, finally, a social cost of disparate impact that stems
neither from reifying groups nor from personal or vicarious
identification with groups, though it is connected with similar
phenomena. Adverse disparate impact associated with morally
neutral preferences will in some cases reinforce or produce antigroup biases, aversions, and inaccurate stereotypes held by others.
If I prefer to hire the ablest legal theoreticians for my law faculty,
and very few of those available happen to be black, one effect
beyond the effects on individual disappointed black applicants, and
beyond the effects on other blacks (and non-blacks) who identify
with the fortunes of blacks as a group, are the effects on (mostly)
non-blacks in reinforcing or spawning, for example, beliefs in black
48 See Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies,supra note 46, at 771.
49 See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 231-39.
o These social costs are, in fact, clearlyjoint costs; but morally they are perhaps
assignable only to the group identification side of the ledger rather than to the
preferences for goods and services side. Alternatively, should they be morally assigned
to the cheapest cost avoiders? If so, who are the cheapest cost avoiders?
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moral or intellectual inferiority. In assessing the morality of hiring
the ablest legal theoreticians, must I consider these latter effects in
addition to (or instead of) the others?
b. DisparateImpact, Present Social Consequences, and Past Wrongs
Suppose we add another consideration to the previous discussion
of disparate group impact and its present social consequences: the
reason many ordinary preferences result in an adverse disparate
impact on certain groups is because these groups, or at least many
of these groups' members, have been the victims of past wrongs.
Should this in any way affect the moral assessment of these ordinary
preferences or, more precisely, acting on these preferences?
For example, black Americans and American women surely
suffered numerous wrongs in the past. Those wrongs have produced, among other things, effects on the distribution of job skills,
aspirations, and motivations among present-day blacks and women.
Without these past wrongs, it is highly likely that the job skills,
aspirations, and motivations of blacks and women would be more
like the job skills, aspirations, and motivations of present day white
males. Predictably, given the present distribution of skills, etc.among blacks and whites, females and males-and the present
hierarchy of preferences for goods and services, whites and males
achieve disproportionately higher income and status than blacks and
females.
In assessing whether the genesis of present-day skills, etc., in past
wrongs changes the moral analysis of preferences that produce
disparate group impacts, the reader should again bear in mind that
I am bracketing all issues of distributive justice and just institutions,
political rights, etc., beyond discrimination. Included in these
bracketed issues of background justice are those relating to whether,
and to what extent, reparations are due for the past wrongs as a
matter ofjustice. The case for reparations beyond wrongs narrowly
circumscribed both in time frame and in type is quite problematic. 5 1 In any event, I want to inquire whether, beyond reparations,
51 See e.g., Levin, supra note 46, at 231 (noting the virtually endless number of
wrongs that might be eligible for reparations); Glenn C. Loury, Affirmative Action: Is
It Just? Does It Work?, in THE CONsTrrUTIONAL BASES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 109, 124-31 (Shlomo Slonim ed., 1990) (pointing out

the difficulties in identifying proper beneficiaries and payors of reparations);
Christopher W. Morris, ExistentialLimits to the Rectificationof Past Wrongs, 21 AM. PHIL.
Q. 175, 175-78 (1984) (highlighting personal identity problems in imagining how
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past wrongs have any bearing on the morality of present disparate
group impact which results from acting on ordinary preferences. It
is best then to assume, for purposes of this inquiry, that all claims
for reparations have been honored to the extent required by justice.
It is difficult to see how past wrongs affect the assessment of
disparate group impact. Many individuals have been affected in
terms of their present skills, etc., by past wrongs they or their
ancestors suffered, even though they are not members of any group
that is conscious of itself as a victimized group aggrieved by
disparate impact. (Many unrepaired wrongs have victimized and
presently affect white male Protestants. Indeed, many wrongs of the
type I am concerned with in this article-discrimination based on
bias, etc.-have caused the victimized group to redouble its efforts
to succeed and have caused it to do so disproportionately well given
present preferences for goods and services. Asians andJews may be
good examples of groups that have disproportionately succeeded not
only despite, but perhaps because of, past discrimination. Particular
individuals in those groups, however, may suffer present competitive
disadvantages because of past wrongs.) Such individuals are, of
course, frequently the proper recipients of reparations from

wrongdoers, but generally we do not believe that it is wrong to
disprefer, say, in the context of picking a surgeon, one whose hands
were villainously cut off as she was studying to be a surgeon, and
who would have been the best surgeon but for the wrong she
suffered.

This seems to suggest that our concern for past wrongdoing is
exhausted by the subject of reparations. It does not appear to bear
on the morality of acting on present ordinary preferences.
c. The Special(?) Case of Preferencesfor Traditional Ways
of Doing Things
As a final case, assume a preference that has a disparate impact
on socially significant groups that have suffered past wrongs, and
that is also tainted and perhaps based in part on others' reactions.
The best examples-and surely ones that are currently engendering
considerable controversy-are preferences for certain traditions. In
hiring the president of an Ivy League college, the trustees may prefer
someone who fits the traditional image of the school, someone, say,
with the looks and the enunciation of a John Houseman or John

present day persons would have fared but for past discrimination).
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Gielgud. This preference may well be tainted as I have defined
tainted. It surely will disprefer blacks, women, and recent immigrants (except those from the British Isles). And it may well be
based on nothing more "objective" than the faculties', students', and
alumni's love of the tradition it taps into for its own sake. The same
may be true of myriad other traditions-from traditions in the
workplace that, say, many women regard as uncomfortable or
harassing, to regional or local traditions that certain groups don't
fit into well for emotional, physical, or other reasons, to even purely
academic traditions regarding scholarly and teaching styles and
curricular preferences that might disproportionately negatively
52
impact certain groups.
The question raised by preferences for traditional ways is
whether combining taint, disparate impact, past wrongs, and perhaps
reactions produces preferences that are inherently illegitimate even
if none of those attributes singly does so. I cannot see how. I have
just argued that disparate impact, even when it affects groups that
have suffered past wrongs and affects them because of those wrongs,
does not in itself make preferences illegitimate. 53 The reactions
at issue in tainted preferences for traditions are themselves simply
tainted preferences for traditions. Therefore, the question is
whether tainted origins produce illegitimacy in preferences that
result in disparate impact. Since I have also argued that tainted
preferences are, in most cases, 54 morally equivalent to ordinary
preferences, the answer must be "no."
The legitimacy of preferences for traditional ways is not just a
matter of repudiating various possible sources of illegitimacy. There
is also a positive case. Our traditions and our preferences for them
in large part define who we are both individually and as a community. All traditions contain some tainted history and disparately impact
some groups. Thus, to ask people to repudiate such preferences is
to ask them to create their preferences and thus themselves ex nihilo.
52 The attacks on academic traditions will be quite familiar to most readers of this
article. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Approach-Avoidance in Law School Hiring: Is The Law
a WASP?, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 631,634-41 (1990). Academic Questions, the journal of
the National Association of Scholars, regularly chronicles the assaults on academic
traditions based on charges of taint and disparate impact. Nonacademics will probably
be more familiar with attacks on school nicknames-for example, the Stanford Indians
(now
5 the Cardinals) or various Southern high school teams called the Rebels.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
' The exceptions are cases of aversions to people based on unconscious biases.
See supra text accompanying note 42.
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Ironically, many of those who inveigh against preferences for
traditional ways also attack liberalism for creating alienated,
deracinated individuals, deprived of needed community and
tradition.
III. WHEN Is ACTING ON CERTAIN PREFERENCES MORALLY WRONG
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT?

The taxonomy of various discriminatory preferences is now
complete. In this Part, I wish to offer some very tentative conclusions about the moral status of those preferences and about the
implications of my moral assessment for legislation concerning
private discrimination. I have raised most of the considerations that
bear on moral status in the process of discussing each type of
discriminatory preference, and I have at least hinted at what moral
conclusions I think should be drawn. Now I want to synthesize these
separate and incomplete moral evaluations, even if the general moral
picture I paint is very fuzzy and offered with less than total conviction.
First, I should remind the reader once again where the moral
inquiry is situated with respect to other moral considerations raised
by private discriminatory acts. I am assuming for the limited
purposes of this inquiry that the society within which the discriminatory acts occur is basically just, and that no one is, by virtue of these
discriminatory acts, deprived of those basic resources and rights to
which all persons are entitled as a matter of justice. I am thus
prescinding the analysis of discrimination from the more general
problem of social justice. I am further assuming that even where a
person has a moral right to discriminate, such discrimination can be
morally criticizable (i.e., that one can have a "right" to do "wrong").
Moreover, and perhaps most crucially for legal audiences, I am
assuming that if discrimination is morally wrong, then, though one
may have a moral right to engage in it, it is possible that one may
not. If one lacks a moral right to engage in morally wrong discrimination, the case for legal prohibition is open, though not by any
means conclusive.
Thus, my inquiry rests on assumptions that are inconsistent with
the Right, which treats all preferences as exogenous givens and
concerns itself with establishing the moral boundaries/entitlements
within which there is a moral right to act on any and all preferences,
from the most elevated to the most hateful. My inquiry also rests
on assumptions inconsistent with the Left, which, like the Right,
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treats all preferences as exogenous givens, though in the Left's case
it is because only the distributional pattern of results in terms of
wealth, "meaningful" work, etc., matter, not the preferences that
produce the distributional pattern. Finally, I am assuming many
preferences are revisable on the basis of moral reflection and are not
all incorrigible facts, like hunger, with which persons must contend
but cannot affect.
Second, it should be clear from the discussion in Part II that
notions like "equality" or "equality of opportunity" will not be
helpful in assessing discriminatory preferences, at least given the
assumptions that frame my inquiry. I share the view expressed by
others that "equality" itself is an empty concept for purposes of
normative criticism.55 Even if that view is incorrect as a general
matter, it is surely correct when distinguishing among forms of
discrimination on moral grounds, since all discrimination produces
inequality between those preferred and those dispreferred.
Similarly, the concept of "equality of opportunity" will not aid in
assessing the morality of discrimination, because the concept can
mean anything from formal legal equality ("it is legally permissible
to hire blacks as well as whites") to equality of result ("everyone must
get the same jobs, the same working conditions, and the same
income; thus, private discrimination of any type is inconsistent with
equality of opportunity"). 56 Any decision reached regarding which
discrimination is morally permissible and which is impermissible
produces a certain conception of equality of opportunity, but it is
not-because logically it cannot be-the product of that empty
concept.
I think that the most perspicacious way of analyzing the morality
of discriminatory preferences is first to divide those preferences into
the intrinsically immoral and intrinsically benign. Intrinsically
immoral preferences are those that are not held by fully informed
and rational persons and that produce unnecessary harms to others.
Intrinsically benign preferences may be immoral, but if they are, it
is a result of extrinsic, contingent conditions.

55

See Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S. CAL. L. REv. 3, 9-13 (1989);
Larry Alexander, StrikingBack at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin'S
Theoty of Law, 6 L. & PHIL. 419, 426-31 (1987); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 578 (1982).
M See ChristopherJencks, What Must Be EqualforOpportunityto Be Equal?,in EQuAL
OPPORTUNTY 47, 71-73 (Norman E. Bowie ed., 1988); Westen, supra note 55.
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A. Intrinsically Immoral Preferences

Biases-except for those reflecting close personal ties that are so
central to one's identity they amount to "biases" in favor of oneself57--are paradigmatically intrinsically immoral. Biases rest on
erroneous judgments of others' inferior moral worth, and they insult
and produce justifiable resentment in the dispreferred, harms that
are unnecessary additions to the inevitable harms of being dispreferred. Preferences based on ideologies regarding role ideals that
cannot be defended and that are experienced as oppressive by the
dispreferred also fall into the camp of the intrinsically immoral.
On the other hand, ordinary preferences for goods and services,
regardless of their impact in terms of income and status on various
groupings of individuals, and regardless of their impact on persons
who have suffered past wrongs, are intrinsically benign. 58 Such
preferences express no defamatory judgment about the dispreferred,
only the judgment that the discriminator prefers some trait the
dispreferred lack over traits they possess. One cannot assume both
that a realm of free choice is morally permissible and, at the same
time, that ordinary preferences and the judgments they express are
impermissible.
Although this will no doubt be more controversial, I also contend
that tainted preferences are intrinsically benign. Perhaps my view
is affected by my difficulties in imagining a set of preferences in
which all historical tribalisms that have made particular cultures what
they are never existed. Our tastes in art, music, sports, etc., are so
heavily culturally influenced, and the culture itself is so much a
product of morally unrespectable views now discarded, that the
counterfactual world of untainted preferences lies beyond my limited
powers of imaginative reconstruction. In any event, a tainted
preference can become autonomous from its disreputable origin, and
when it does so, I believe it will withstand the test of cognitive
psychotherapy-endorsement by the clearheaded and fully self-aware
agent 5 9 -that biases and inaccurate stereotypes will fail. More
controversially, I also believe that tainted preferences must be
57 see supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
5 By calling a preference "intrinsically benign," I mean only that it is not
intrinsically immoral; intrinsically benign preferences include both the morally neutral
and the morally positive, and in either case particular examples of such preferences
may be ultimately adjudged immoral because of extrinsic considerations.
9 See BRANDT, supra note 40, at 11.
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deemed intrinsically benign even when they are not autonomous
60
from their biased origins.
Proxy discrimination, when use of the proxy trait is a cost/
benefit justified means of satisfying ordinary preferences, is also
intrinsically benign. This is so regardless of whether the proxy trait
correlates with the trait for which it is a proxy as a matter of physical
laws or sociological and psychological generalizations.
Proxy discrimination based upon inaccurate and usually biasdriven stereotyping are intrinsically immoral for the same reasons
as are the biases with which they are intimately linked. This is surely
true once the inaccuracy of the stereotype or lack of cost-justification
is revealed to the proxy discriminator. On the other hand, proxy
discrimination that is unknowingly premised on inaccurate stereotypes or is otherwise not cost-justified, but is not bias driven, is best
regarded as intrinsically benign.
Consideration of reactions as part of assessing qualifications is
also intrinsically benign, despite the fact that it might often be
immoral for various other reasons. From the discriminator's
standpoint, consideration of reactions is, like proxy discrimination,
merely part of finding the best person for the job, which is itselfjust
an ordinary preference. The discriminator is not expressing a biased
or distorted judgment about the dispreferred, but is merely
rationally seeking the least costily means of satisfying what are often
perfectly respectable preferences. (Consider as an illustration the
preferential hiring of black police officers to satisfy the preference
for improved police protection in areas where reactions to white
officers will hinder their performance.) Although the reactions may
often express intrinsically immoral preferences, taking them into
account does not.
The final, and for me the most difficult to assess, discriminatory
preference is the personal aversion to people with particular traits,
such as membership in a certain racial or ethnic group or possession
of some physical characteristic, inborn or acquired. On the one
hand, these personal aversions are closely connected with biases and
inaccurate stereotypes and commonly arise from them. Moreover,
they surely have the capacity to insult and hurt, even if they are not
libelous per se. On the other hand, like tainted ordinary preferences
for goods and services, they can become relatively autonomous from
their immoral origins and function for the discriminator no

60 See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
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differently from aversions to spiders, snakes, and '40s big band
music. Whether these preferences can be eradicated at little cost to
the discriminator through cognitive psychotherapy is, I suppose, a
matter of how deeply they are imbedded in the discriminator's basic
personality and how autonomous they are from their progenitor
judgments.
My conclusion is that some personal aversions-those that reflect
nothing more than currently operative biases and/or inaccurate
stereotyping, conscious or unconscious-are intrinsically immoral,
whereas other personal aversions, if immoral at all, are only
extrinsically immoral. Nevertheless, I must confess to being quite
uncertain about even this rather hedged conclusion.
B. IntrinsicallyBenign and Only Contingently Immoral Preferences

1. Effects That Bear on the Morality of Intrinsically
Benign Preferences
a. Effects Caused by the Discrimination

Discriminatory preferences that are not intrinsically immoral may
nonetheless be extrinsically-contingently--immoral because of the
effects on others of acting on those preferences. Although the most
notable effects for assessing the extrinsic morality of discriminatory
preferences were mentioned in Part II in my catalogue of such
preferences, it is helpful to list them again here independently of the
types of preferences that produce them. First, discriminating on the
basis of some kinds of traits may often reinforce others' biases,
immoral ideals, aversions, and inaccurate stereotypes, even if the
discrimination itself is not of this nature. Use of race, for example,
even where it is a rational proxy for an ordinary preference or a
rational response to others' reactions, tends to feed residual racial
biases, stereotypes, and aversions. These are serious negative effects
that a discriminator should definitely consider, even though there
is merit in the discriminator's likely claim that these effects are
attributable to others' immoralities. It is, after all, morally reprehensible to leave an injured person in a high-crime area when he could
be taken to safety with little hardship or risk, even though the danger
he faces from abandonment is due to others' immoral tendencies.
A second set of negative social consequences consists of the
psychic and motivational effects on members of the group defined
by the disfavored trait. Members of the group whose sense of
personal identity is very much bound up with such membership, by
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observing so few other members in particular roles, may conclude
erroneously that those roles are unrealistic aspirations and fail to
develop talents that would be individually and socially rewarding.
I say they may conclude this erroneously because most often, were
they to develop the talents in question, the roles would be open to
them. One exception to this is the use of a trait as a rational proxy,
where what makes the proxy rational are the choices persons with
the trait can be predicted to make in the present culture. Use of
such proxies may tend to freeze the culture in its present state. For
example, if because of accurate predictions of women's childbearing
preferences, employers fail to promote them to certain jobs, women
may tend to be reinforced in their childbearing preferences, thus
freezing the cultural pattern, perhaps at great social cost in terms
61
of lost productivity.
One might argue that the discriminator should not be saddled
with concern for social effects caused either by erroneousjudgments
about opportunities or by the actions of those countless others who
contribute to making stereotypical judgments rational and thus to
sustaining cultural patterns. I shall deal with the latter half of the
claim when I deal with costs to the discriminator of forgoing use of
certain intrinsically benign traits. As for requiring the discriminator
to take account of others' misreadings of the situation he is helping
to create, we frequently morally require people to take others as they
are, with all of their tendencies to misjudge reality. For members
of a group such as blacks, with their generally low socioeconomic
status, poor education, and long history of oppression, it is quite
natural to read the absence of blacks in a position as an indicator
that efforts expended on attaining that position would be wasted,
even if that is in fact untrue. Moreover, many of those to whom the
"role model" argument applies are children, whose responsibility for
misjudgments is diminished.
If we turn from motivational to psychic effects on members of
dispreferred groups, we see effects that range from the resentment
of "guilt by association" judgments represented by use of certain
proxies to the loss of self-esteem suffered by those whose sense of
well-being or most central sense of identity is inextricably bound to
the fortunes of certain groups. An example of the former effect is
that of a woman who may feel resentful that she is denied a position
based on a quite rational prediction that she will choose eventually
61

See Kelman, supra note 21, at 1160-61, 1232-33.
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to leave her current position to rear children because most women
her age do so. An example of the latter effect is that of a black who
may identify with the plight of blacks as a group, so that the low
socioeconomic status of the group is felt by her as an injury she
shares even though she is socioeconomically successful, or perhaps
even as a crippling blow to her own self-esteem. These are the most
common psychic harms produced by intrinsically benign preferences.
The case for requiring the discriminator to consider these
psychic costs when deciding whether to discriminate on the basis of
a particular trait is weaker than the case for requiring consideration
of motivational effects. Although the resentment of "guilt by
association" judgments is a natural resentment of the use of proxies
that one "knows" do not predict one's own talents or behavior, proxy
judgments are quite rational and inevitable. We cannot ask people
to ignore at their peril statistical correlations between particular
traits and unwanted behavior, even if the correlation is based on free
choices.
The psychic harms from group identification are a product of
both the discriminator's choice to use a trait to disfavor certain
groups and the group member's choice to identify with the group
defined by that trait and its fortunes. A manufacturer who wishes
to employ only skilled widget makers may be quite indignant when
told that she must consider that decision's costs to those who
identify with the group defined as "those unskilled at widget
making." Identification with such a group is not just strange and
surprising. Rather, the identification looks like just another taste.
It is also one that, if it wishes to be taken into account, should
compete with others in the market. If people prefer that a disfavored group do better, it is they, rather than the discriminators in
question, who should attempt to achieve this, perhaps by spending
their own money on, for example, a voluntary private affirmative
action plan.
Although the argument against considering psychic effects is
plausible, a strong counterargument also exists. Although I am
generally assuming a framework of rights, I have also pointed out
in making this assumption that moral criticism of discrimination may
lead us to revise our original estimate of where the boundaries
established by these rights are located. If we assume in the case of
psychic effects that the moral right lies with the discriminator, then
of course it follows that those who identify with the dispreferred
must compensate the discriminator if they wish to advance the
dispreferred group. On the other hand, if these psychic costs cause
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us to reconsider assigning the moral entitlement to the discriminator
and to assign it instead to those with the psychic injuries, then the
discriminator will be forced morally to internalize these costs of
discriminating on the basis of the trait in question.
The appropriateness of assigning these psychic costs to the use
of the trait in discriminatory decisions leads to a more general
debate in normative theory. This debate turns on whether calculation of social welfare should include external preferences-meaning
preferences about how other people should be treated or should
fare-as opposed to personal preferences-preferences about one's
own treatment and prospects.6 2 External preferences are preferences of particular people, and they are just as much preferences,
and held at least as strongly, as purely personal preferences. 63 On
the other hand, even if one rejects Ronald Dworkin's "double
counting" criticism, 64 there are surely some bedeviling practical and
perhaps theoretical difficulties in counting external preferences. If
we count some people's preference that blacks as a group prosper
in our assessment of the morality of using a trait that disproportionately adversely impacts on blacks as a group, do we also count other
people's preferences that whites do better? Moreover, there will be
a multitude of crosscutting group preferences and identifications.
What helps blacks as a group might have a disproportionate adverse
impact on other groups that are the subjects of psychic identifications and vicarious concerns, such as women as a group or Jews as
a group. Should discriminators be morally saddled with the task of
considering all these conflicting external preferences when deciding
whether to act on an intrinsically benign preference? 65
I leave unresolved the question of how these psychic costs of
group identifications bear on the morality of intrinsically benign
discrimination. There remains one additional category of costs
occasioned by such discrimination that deserves mention: the
62 See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 232-38.

63 See C. Edwin Baker, Counting Preferencesin Collective Choice Situations,25 UCLA
L. REV. 381,393 (1978); Gerald Dworkin, EqualRespectandtheEnforcement ofMorality,
7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 180, 188-89 (1990);John H. Ely, Professor Dworkin's External/
PersonalPreferenceDistinction,
1983 DUKE L.J. 959,961-64. For an excellent discussion
of the role of preferences regarding others' preference satisfaction, welfare, status,

etc., see Donald Hubin, Non.tuism, 21 CAN.J. PHIL. 441 (1991).
64 See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 234-38.
' Note the relation to the paradox of the Paretian liberal, which deals with
problems associated with preferences regarding how others exercise their rights. See
e.g.,Jonathan Riley, Rights to Liberty in Purely PrivateMatters: Part1, 5 ECON. & PHIL.
121, 133, 155-58 (1989).
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category of civil strife and disharmony. For example, some members
of some groups with which they identify feel such a stake in the
fortunes of the group qua group that, to raise the group's status, they
are prepared to engage in tactics that threaten social peace and
harmony, which are themselves public goods.
When private
discrimination employs traits that thwart those groups' advancement
qua groups, thus indirectly endangering social peace and harmony,
it creates a negative externality by jeopardizing these public goods.
Again, is this negative externality attributable to the discriminator
for purposes of moral assessment of the discrimination, or is it
attributable only to those group advocates who directly threaten
social peace and harmony?

Finally, the social costs of particular kinds of discrimination are
a function of how widespread those kinds of discrimination are.
Harms associated with the absence of role models obviously occur
only if the trait with which others identify is used quite frequently
by private discriminators as the basis for exclusion of some from
some benefit. One idiosyncratic use of a particular trait by a single
discriminator is unlikely to affect the perception by members of the
group defined by that trait of their general likelihood of obtaining
positions and goods. For instance, if a particular employer wants his
employees to have red hair, this is unlikely to affect brunettes' and
blondes' perception of their life prospects and thus their motivation
and development of talents. On the other hand, if many discriminators use the same trait to exclude, motivational and psychic effects
are more likely to occur, especially if many people perceive their
personal identity largely in terms of possession of that trait.66
Although any individual discriminator's contribution to these costs
is de minimis, each discriminator is contributing to the production
of an external social cost in addition to the cost to the dispreferred
person(s)-unlike the discriminator who idiosyncratically prefers
redheads, a trait not specially preferred by many others.

66 This is a favorite theme for those concerned about how groups are faring. See
supra note 46 (citing articles focusing on the effect of civil rights initiatives on
minorities, women, and the handicapped).
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b. Effects on the Discriminatorof Forgoingthe Discrimination
In assessing the morality of discrimination that is not intrinsically
immoral, the costs to the discriminator of forgoing the discrimination must also be taken into account in addition to the costs to the
dispreferred, to those who identify with them, and to society in
general. For some preferences, forbearance incurs high psychic
costs. If an intrinsically benign preference is both central to the
discriminator's self-definition and high in her hierarchy of values,
then discrimination that is mandated by such a preference will be
very costly for the discriminator to forgo. If the discrimination is
based on a shallow preference-one forsworn with little psychic costor if the preference is merely a preference for the most efficient
means of satisfying some further preference, then renouncing the
preference will be less costly. If the trait defining the most efficient
employees produces high social costs, whereas the trait that defines
the slightly less efficient employees does not, choosing the latter trait
over the former will be minimally costly to the discriminator but
socially beneficial. Of course, losses of efficiency translate into
monetary losses that ultimately translate into forgoing things that are
intrinsically valuable to the discriminator. Thus, even if the
discriminator is not deeply attached to the preference defining the
most efficient means, she may be deeply attached to the preferences
that the most efficient means enables her to realize. Nonetheless,
some forms of discrimination, though rational, will be less costly to
forgo than others.
Another factor to consider in assessing the costs to discriminators of forgoing certain forms of discrimination is whether the costs
can be eliminated or reduced once collective action problems are
eliminated. For instance, many employers in choosing employees
would be quite willing to overlook immoral consumer reactions if
assured that their competitors would also do so. The consumers, if
faced with the choice between forgoing the service and dealing with
employees against whom they were biased, might all choose the latter
course of action. In such a case, no employer would lose any profits
if all employers joined in or were forced into refraining from
catering to consumer biases.
In the cases where the discriminator is considering forgoing use
of traits defining efficient employees or forgoing use of efficient
proxy traits, solving collective action problems might eliminate some
of the costs to employers of forgoing the use of such traits, such as
losses to competitors who continue to discriminate on the bases of
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those traits. It is not likely to eliminate all of the costs, however,
since forgoing the use of the efficient traits will raise the price of the
good or service and probably reduce the demand. Realistically,
asking discriminators to forgo efficient traits, proxy or non-proxy,
will impose costs on them that can only be partially passed on to
others even if collective action problems are eliminated.6 7
C. Immutability of Traits
How should a trait's immutability or relative costliness to change
bear on the morality of discrimination on the basis of such a trait?
If discrimination is based on judgments of relative moral worth,
then, of course, we good Kantians are likely to reject such judgments
if they are based on immutable characteristics. Moral worth must
be based on moral choices, not on physical characteristics or even
character traits to the extent that such traits are not just proxies for
the prior moral choices that formed them.
If we shift the focus from biases to other forms of discrimination,
however, the relative immutability of a trait seems to drop out as an
independent factor. People will rarely deeply identify with traits that

are easily changed, especially if we factor psychic costs into the
determination of how changeable a trait is. One's religious identification is a trait that is easily changeable in one sense, but not in the
sense that I think is relevant. Gender is now mutable in the sense
that sex-change operations are available. But the monetary expense
of a sex-change operation-which can be translated into the psychic
costs of forgoing other goods that the money could buy-as well as
the psychic costs that most people would suffer from undergoing
such a procedure, make gender immutable in any relevant sense.
Indeed, the psychic costs and basic opportunity costs associated with
changing a trait with which one identifies define the relevant
immutability of a trait. Those psychic costs, however, have already
been covered in the previous discussion.

67

See Michael H. Gottesman, Twelve Topics to Consider Before Opting for Racial

Quotas, 79 GEo. LJ. 1737, 1746-48 (1991).
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D. Immoral Discriminationand MoralRights
1. The Moral Rights of the Discriminator
The previous discussion has focused on the factors relevant to
determining whether the discriminator is acting immorally in
preferring and disfavoring certain traits. Determining that the
discrimination is immoral, however, may not answer the question
whether the discriminator is acting within his or her moral rights.
One may have the moral right to act immorally in some circumstances. The value of autonomy warrants ascribing to agents a moral
space-a space protected by moral rights-in which the agent may
exercise that autonomy in a variety of ways, including ways that are
intrinsically or extrinsically immoral. For example, a person who in
choosing a spouse or an intimate companion excludes members of
a particular race solely because of a bias may be acting within her
moral rights even if she is acting immorally. Likewise, a person who,
based on religious convictions that women should stay at home or
that blacks are inferior, refuses to let women preach in or to let
blacks join his church, may be acting within his rights even if
immorally.
In saying that one may have a moral right to engage in intrinsically immoral discrimination, I am adopting an orthodox though not
uncontroverted view of the moral universe. 68 Some thoroughgoing
act utilitarians might, of course, deny the gap between moral rights
and morally right actions. Most act utilitarians, however, would
probably, for strategic reasons, grant moral rights to act immorally
if we construe moral rights as morally warranted claims against
coercion. 69 So, too, would even those nonutilitarians such as
Joseph Raz, who deny any moral value to the exercise of autonomy
when it is expressed in immoral choices. 7' Raz argues that although the value of autonomy requires for its realization a range of
alternative projects and lifestyles from which to choose, it does not
require that any of those alternatives be immoral ones. 7 1 In fact,
Raz argues, autonomy's moral value is fully cashed out in the moral
value of the objects of choice, so that the autonomy to opt for what

669 SeeJeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21, 34-37 (1981).
See, e.g.,JoHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE 48-57 (1983).
See RAZ, supra note 4 at 381; see also Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value:

70

Reflections on Raz's MoRALrn' OF FREEDOM, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1082-85 (1989).
71 See RAZ, supra note 4, at 410-12.
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is immoral can itself have no positive moral value. 72 But despite
his position that there is no moral value in autonomy exercised
immorally, Raz rejects the use of coercion-legal sanctions-to deter
immoral choices simply because they are immoral.7" Even Raz
would probably grant unqualified legal rights to bigots to choose
their spouses or co-religionists or to dispose of some forms of
personal property in bigoted ways.
2. The Moral Rights of Victims of Immoral Discrimination
The costs to others imposed by immoral discrimination are not
only part of the calculus by which its (extrinsic) immorality is
determined; they may also bear on the question of the victims' moral
rights to be free of the discrimination. I assumed as a hypothetical
background for this inquiry that victims' just claims were fully
honored, and I stated that in general I would be attempting to
ascertain the morality of discrimination on the basis of that assumption; however, I also stated that the boundary line separating claims
of denial of one's just share from other moral objections to discrimination might be fixed, at least in part, by a determination that
the discrimination is immoral. For example, if we conclude that an
employer's immoral discrimination in selecting employees does not
fall within the realm of her moral rights, then we might conclude
that the rights of prospective employees include freedom from at
least some of this immoral discrimination. Put differently, justice
may include a right to be free of seriously immoral forms of
discrimination in employment. On the other hand, there will be
some, perhaps many, types of discrimination that, though immoral
vis-a-vis the victims, and though not within the realm of the
discriminator's moral rights, are not violative of the victims' moral
rights.
3. Immoral Discrimination and Moral Rights: A Summary
The way in which the morality of various types of discrimination
affects the boundaries of the discriminators' and the victims' moral
rights ultimately depends upon the background moral theory from
which those rights are derived. For example, a derivation from a
thoroughly consequentialist theory might be more sensitive to the
72 See id. at 373-81.

73 See id. at 403-04, 418-19.
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effects of various types of discrimination than a derivation from a
non-consequentialist moral theory.
The map of the moral universe that emerges from the previous
discussion looks like this. Some immoral discrimination (and lots
of morally permissible discrimination) falls within the discriminator's
moral rights. Some immoral discrimination violates its victims'
moral rights. (No morally permissible discrimination could violate
others' moral rights since it would for that reason not be morally
permissible.) If additionally one believes that moral rights do not
cover the realm of all possible actions, then there is a middle realm,
of uncertain size, between the moral rights of the discriminator and
those of the victims. In that middle range are located some, and
perhaps many, immoral forms of discrimination, along with perhaps
some morally permissible forms.
E. The Law and Immoral Discrimination
The law, properly employed, will attempt first to secure moral

rights, both those of the discriminators and those of the victims of
discrimination. Because the law is a blunt instrument, however, and
its necessary formality and enforcement imperfections will cause it
to deviate from precisely tracking the subtle boundaries of moral
rights, it will not and should not be designed to produce total
enforcement of moral rights. In some cases, because the space
between discriminators' and victims' moral rights is so small or is
nonexistent, total enforcement of victims' moral rights will jeopardize discriminators' moral rights, and vice versa. In other cases, the
costs of total legal enforcement-monetary costs and/or costs of legal
intrusiveness-will jeopardize other important values, including moral
rights. The law then should not concern itself with all possible
violations of moral rights, but should instead select for prohibition
those broad types of discrimination that are most likely to be
immoral, intrinsically or extrinsically, that are either likely to violate
victims' rights or to cause a great amount of social harm, that are
least likely to be matters of discriminators' moral rights, and that are
least costly to detect and establish in court.
How well does the American law of private discrimination, at
least on the federal level, 74 satisfy these criteria for legal prohibition?

74 My focus here is on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e
(1988); the Fair Housing Act of 1968, id. §§ 3601-31; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988); the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct of 1967, id. § 623;

204

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:149

Some of the prohibited traits on which to base discrimination-race,
sex, religion, and national origin-are traits a high percentage of use
of which will reflect biases, unjustified ideologies, inaccurate
stereotypes (usually bias-driven), shallow personal aversions (usually
bias-driven), and reaction qualifications where the reactions are
immoral. Some of the traits, specifically race and sex, also identify
types of discrimination that have been widespread and socially costly.
On the other hand, this seems to be less true-though not completely
untrue-of the traits of old age and handicap.
An additional point in favor of the federal anti.discrimination
laws-leaving aside the 1866 civil rights laws embodied in §§ 1981
and 1982 of the United States Code 75 -is that they limit their
prohibitions to contexts where the moral rights of discriminators are
least likely to be implicated. Discrimination is prohibited by
employers or landlords in businesses or apartments that are large
enough not to involve personal relationships or personal aversions
as major concerns in hiring or renting. 76 Discrimination by small
employers and landlords-and by employees and consumers in all
contexts7 7 -is not prohibited. There are also exemptions for
religious organizations.7 8 The scope and limitation of the laws on
discrimination in public accommodation or in the use of federal
funds show the same solicitude for the discriminators' moral
rights. 79 There is, of course, no ban on discrimination in the
context of personal relations.
The bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") component
of federal employment discrimination law also fits the prescription
for legal intervention rather well."0 Sex or religion will only rarely

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, id. §§ 793-94; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1988).
75 See 42 U.S.C. §§.1981-82 (1988).
76 See id. §§ 2000e(b), § 3603(b)(2).
77 Interestingly, not even the most sweeping civil rights laws, such as §§ 1981 and
1982, which have been construed (erroneously, in my opinion) by the Supreme Court
to reach private discrimination, see City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120-24
(1981), have ever been applied to discrimination against employers by prospective
employees, or to discrimination againstsellers by prospective buyers. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-82 (1988); Lawrence A. Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, ConsumerBoycotts
and Freedom of Assodation: A Comment on a Recently Proposed Theorj, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 555, 560-62 (1985).
78 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(e), 3607 (1988).
79 See, e.g., id. § 2000a(e) (stating that private dubs are not subject to restrictions
on discrimination in public accommodations).
80 Employers may use religion, sex, or national origin as a factor in their decisions
"to hire and employ... in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
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qualify as BFOQs; therefore, allowing discrimination based thereon
when they are BFOQs will not produce major external social costs.
Moreover, BFOQ law becomes confusing exactly where one would
expect-where what purports to make sex and religion BFOQs are
consumer reactions whose moral status is ambiguous. For example,
the courts have treated airlines' preferences for female cabin

attendants as violative of the law without regard to the flying public's
clear preference for females in that role. 81 On the other hand,
hiring females as strippers or as models for dresses-where being
female is a BFOQ only given a public preference for sex-differentiated striptease shows and sex-differentiated clothing-has been
82
deemed permissible.
Use of the forbidden grounds as rational proxies, in contrast to
their use as BFOQs, is forbidden in the employment context.
Although sometimes race and sex will in fact be rational proxies for
an employer to use, there are reasons for making their use per se
illegal. First, even their use as rational proxies may be extrinsically
immoral because of the social effects of such use. Second, many
claims that the use of such grounds as proxies is rational will be
covers for the expression of immoral biases or aversions. Third,
even if their use as proxies is not immoral, forbidding their use in
the contexts in which the employment discrimination law applies
("largish" firms) is quite unlikely to infringe employers' moral rights.
Finally, a per se ban on their use as proxies may be quite preferable
to an attempt to adjudicate the legitimacy of each use on a case by
case basis.
On the other hand, legal suppression of quite cost-effective
proxies will produce a strong incentive to find close substitutes for
the forbidden proxies.8" If such substitutes can be found, the costs
of forbidding the original proxies will be largely averted along with
the social costs of allowing their use. If there are no close substitutes for the forbidden proxies, however, the prohibition will result
in imposition of substantial costs on the business in question, their
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation... [of the employer's] business or enterprise." Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). This
exception is not permitted when the discrimination is based on race or color.
a See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
82 See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 15.10
(1992).
83 See Williams, supra note 46, at 1780-82.
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employees, and their customers, and may even result in harm to the
84
prohibition's intended beneficiaries.
In the realm of private insurance, use of race, sex, etc., as proxies
is not currently forbidden, at least at the federal level, when the
insurance is offered by an insurance company and not by the
employer.8 5 Insurance, of course, is by its very nature built upon
proxies. But we could require that risks not be differentiated along
certain lines even if such differentiation is justified by resource
allocation considerations.
With an important qualification, ordinary and tainted preferences that result in a disparate impact along racial, sexual, and other
lines-and no preference that I can imagine, except a preference for
selection by random procedures, will fail to produce a disparate
impact on either blacks or whites, or on either females or males, and
so forth-are not prohibited, even if the disparate impact has, or in
any event is alleged to have, major social consequences. Employment discrimination law took a substantial step toward outlawing all
preferences for employees that produce disparate impact along the
named axes in the 1971 case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,86 in which
the Supreme Court held that an employment practice disproportionately and adversely affecting blacks' employment opportunities must

84 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAwS 242-66, 258 (1992) (arguing that "the application of [Tide VII]
to private discrimination in competitive markets generates not only administrative
costs but allocative losses as well.... The real private gains, shared by blacks and
whites alike... are diminished when private choices are subjected to systematic state
scrutiny.").
To say there are costs associated with prohibiting the use of certain cost-effective
proxies is not to say of course that such a prohibition is unjustifiable. The associated
social costs of using the proxies may be greater than the costs of their prohibition or
may be less fairly distributed. Moreover, the costs may represent a tax to effect a
crude form of reparations to those groups benefitted by the prohibition, reparations
that may be justified in our society but not in the more ideal society that I am
assuming in this article. I owe this last point to Ken Simons. See supra note 38. I am
skeptical of the tenability of such a reparations justification. Seesupra note 51. lam
equally skeptical that the costs of prohibiting cost-effective proxies can be justified as
a tax in furtherance of a more just distribution of wealth; there are undoubtedly a
multitude of less crude, less costly-notjust in general, but also to many of the poorand less racially-skewed alternatives.
8 For an excellent discussion of employer-provided insurance and the federal
antidiscrimination laws, see EPSTEIN, supra note 84, at 340-49. See also MartinJ. Katz,
Insuranceand the Limits ofRationalDiscrimination,8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 436,437-38
(1990) (discussing state regulation of insurance companies' choices of proxies and
noting that "no state has instituted a comprehensive prohibition of'impact' rational
discrimination").
86 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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be justified by business necessity. The case could be viewed as
establishing an evidentiary and procedural framework for smoking
out covert uses of forbidden criteria 7 -the absence of business
necessity resulting in a conclusive presumption of such uses-and it
was applied only when the adverse impact fell on blacks rather than
(Otherwise, every
whites or on females rather than males. 88
employment practice would be vulnerable to the requirement that
it be justified by business necessity.) The Supreme Court retreated
from Griggs to some extent in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, s 9
though Congress has attempted to reinstate Griggs in a new civil
rights bill signed by President Bush. 90 The underlying rationale
for forbidding preferences for employees that produce adverse
disparate impact on certain groups remains unclear when the
preferences do not reflect biases and are otherwise cost-justified.
Perhaps the rationale is the same as that behind forbidding the use
of certain traits as proxies, even if such use is currently costjustified.9 1 Interestingly, the law distinguishes between search
costs-which the Griggs approach requires the employer to incur by
precluding cost-justified employment criteria-and training costs,
which are not required by the Griggs approach. 92 In other words,
87 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 93-95 (1991).
88 Interestingly, the Court refused to extend Griggs to practices that adversely
affected groups of foreign national origin. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86, 94-95 (1973).
There are two aspects of the Griggs rule that suggest that its rationale is not one
of smoking out covert uses of forbidden criteria deemed unfair to excluded
individuals, but is instead one of legally establishing a presumption of proportional
representation of certain groups qua groups in the workplace. First, there is no cause
of action available to, for example, an individual black excluded by criteria that are
arbitrary relative to business goals but that do not disproportionately disadvantage
blacks as a group, even if criteria that would pass the business necessity test would
have produced a workforce in which blacks were "overrepresented." Second, there
is a cause of action available to any black excluded by criteria that fail to satisfy the
Griggsrule even if it is likely that criteria that would have passed the business necessity
test would also have excluded more blacks. On the other hand, this proportional
representation interpretation of the Griggsrule is to some extent countered by the fact
that the courts have not applied Griggs where whites have been the disproportionate
impact victims of employment criteria.
"9 490 U.S. 642, 650-52 (1989).
90 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(1991). For a discussion of the "critical transition" from disparate treatment to
disparate impact via Griggs, Wards Cove, and the Civil Rights Acts, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 84, at 182-204.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
92 See Gottesman, supra note 67, at 1750-52; Kelman,supra note 21, at 1162,1202-
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if a protected group is as talented at a job as other groups, but
identifying its talented members is more costly than identifying the
talented members of other groups, the employer must bear the costs.
If a protected group is less talented at the job, however, the
employer need not train its members, even if the costs of training
are less than the identification costs.
Finally, it is permissible for an employer to discriminate on the

basis of the otherwise forbidden criteria if the employer is implementing an ideal of an integrated workplace. In short, racial and
other private affirmative action plans are permitted. 9
F. Three CurrentIssues: Comparable Worth, DisparateImpact,
and Affirmative Action
It will be instructive to conclude my investigation of the morality

of discrimination by focusing on three quite controversial issues
regarding the legal response to discrimination. The first issue is
whether it should be considered illegal sex discrimination for an
employer to have different wage scales for different job categories
where the jobs are of equal "comparable worth," and where the
lower paid job is one predominantly held by women and the higher
paid job one predominantly held by men (the "comparable worth"
issue). The second issue is whether discrimination on the basis of
those traits that lead to a disproportionate exclusion of minorities
and women should be treated either as illegal per se or illegal in the
absence of a compelling justification (the "disparate impact" issue).
The third issue is whether private affirmative action employment
plans that favor women and minorities are legal and/or morally
warranted (the "affirmative action" issue). I shall take these issues
up in turn.
Before doing so, however, I should comment on the limitations
of my prior analysis of discrimination in assessing the real world
problems of comparable worth, disparate impact, and affirmative
action. My prior analysis assumes a just society. The issues that I
deal with here are issues that confront our society as it is, which is
surely not perfectly just by anyone's standards. Moreover, to the
extent that these issues arise in debates over legal policy, straightforward application of my analysis is hindered by the fact that discrimi93 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). This is consistent
with forbidding certain cost-justified proxies, as both represent employers' bearing
bottom-line losses to advance certain groups' prospects. See Sunstein, supra note 21,
at 28-29.
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nation need not be immoral, intrinsically or extrinsically, to be
justifiably and legally prohibited. So long as the prohibition does
not infringe discriminators' moral rights and is otherwise good social
policy, the discrimination it bars may be morally permissible.
Although these limitations, coupled with the relevance of factual
determinations that are outside the domain of this article, preclude
my making strong claims about comparable worth, disparate impact,
and affirmative action, they do not render my analysis completely
beside the point. If in our actual social situation a sound policy can
be predicted to be very costly along some dimensions, then its
benefits in terms of furthering social justice must outweigh those
costs-costs that can also be converted into social justice currencyand it must be the least costly means available for achieving those
benefits. I am skeptical that proposals for achieving comparable
worth and proposals for eliminating disparate impact (including
affirmative action plans) meet these conditions. Even if I am wrong
in my assessment of these issues, however, the validity of my general
framework for the moral analysis of private discrimination is
unaffected.
1. The Comparable Worth Issue
Most job categories are not fully integrated in terms of gender,
so that there are many jobs predominantly held by males and many
jobs predominantly held by females. This situation can be explained
by a number of factors, including: 1) some present-day discrimination against women, usually illegal and covert; 2) some inborn
differences between men and women in terms of certain skills,
strengths, and aptitudes; 3) some present-day disabilities caused by
past discrimination in education and training opportunities; 4) some
real and untainted differences in preferences; and 5) some differences in preferences traceable to ideologies of gender role ("women's
work" and "men's work") and to past discrimination ("don't aspire
tojobs you'll be denied"). When twojobs require "comparable" skill
levels and training, and one is predominantly held by males and the
other predominantly by females, the predominantly male job will
sometimes receive dramatically higher remuneration. This situation
is what concerns the proponents of comparable worth theories of
illegal discrimination. They argue that unequal pay for jobs of
"comparable worth" should be deemed illegal gender discrimination,
at least where women hold the lower paid job.
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In any comparable worth situation it is always possible that there
is an intrinsically immoral gender preference being covertly
expressed by an employer. Or the employer may be surreptitiously
using gender as a proxy or as a reaction qualification under
conditions that make such use extrinsically immoral. In either case,
the covert use of gender will likely be illegal under current antidiscrimination laws without the necessity for treating the practice of
unequal pay for jobs of comparable worth as itself illegal gender
discrimination. Thus, unequal pay forjobs of comparable worth may
be evidence of ordinary forms of illegal gender discrimination even
if it is not illegal per se.
In cases where the employer is merely responding to the supply
of and demand for workers, or to customer demand for the goods
and services she produces, is there any reason to deem the employer's actions immoral and subject to legal prohibition?
The basic cause for unequal pay for jobs of "comparable worth"
is that women and men are particularly attracted to certain jobs and
shun other, higher-paying jobs for which they are otherwise
qualified. They may prefer to be nurses rather than truck drivers,
school teachers rather than plumbers, and so on. With many women
preferring the same jobs, the wage for that job will be driven down
by market forces. If the employer is compelled by moral and/or
legal condemnation to pay more than the market-clearing wage,
distortions will reverberate throughout the economy. Moreover, the
employer is limited in what she can pay employees by the consumer
demand for her products. I might choose to undergo years of
training in order to be able to make sixteenth century lutes. By
"comparable worth" reasoning, I should be paid the salary of a
neurosurgeon. But what if there is no demand for my lutes comparable to the demand for neurosurgery?
Assuming that it is not unjust to have a market economy, which
includes perforce a market in labor, and assuming that differentials
in pay that reflect the supply of and demand for workers are not
generally immoral-even when those differentials exist for jobs of
"comparable worth"-it is difficult to see the case for moral and legal

condemnation of such differentials in the context of gender. 94 Is
the case for comparable worth bolstered by the fact that the
differences in job preferences between males and females are the
94 Unlike the disparate impact concern for group equality that I discuss in the next
section, the comparable worth claim is limited to equality of only those males and
females with comparable skills and training levels.
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product of tainted preferences, preferences traceable to ideologies
of gender roles or to past discrimination against women?9" I have
already said that discriminating on the basis of tainted preferences
is not intrinsically immoral. 6 Are the negative social effects of
unequal pay for jobs of comparable worth such that we should
conclude that such discrimination is extrinsically immoral when
traceable to tainted preferences? Although there are social harms
that occur when, for whatever reasons, individuals do not seek the
most socially valued (in the sense of highest paid)jobs for which they
are qualified, those harms are best redressed through actions that
do not radically distort the workings of the market. (Indeed, those
harms are usually offset by the utility gain to those individuals that
induced them to take the less socially valued job, assuming they were
not misinformed or the victims of false consciousness.) The harms
that would be suffered by the employer were she compelled to pay
above-market wages-harms that reflect the general social harms of
market distortion-surely seem greater than any social harm caused

by unequal pay for jobs of "comparable worth." In any event,
requiring the employer to pay more than the market rate, rather
than redressing the social harm of individual underachievement,
actually exacerbates that social harm by providing incentives to go
into jobs for which there is already an oversupply of qualified
labor.9 7 Ultimately, comparable worth's logical conclusion is the
elimination of the free market and its replacement by a command
economy.

95 See Littleton, supra note 33, at 1296-1301. Littleton argues that her favored
conception of equality-"equality as acceptance"-requires society to treat as equally
valued men's and women's "genderized" (read: tainted) values and inclinations and
to devote equal resources to male and female occupational choices. Littleton omits
discussion of the mechanics and market effects of her proposal and leaves even those
politically close to her unpersuaded. See e.g., Kelman, supra note 21, at 1191-92 &
n.90, 1193 n.93 (disagreeing with Littleton's affirmative distributive principle that
distinct social subgroups have claims to equal per capita income); Mark Kelman,
Emerging Centrist Liberalism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 417, 440-42 (1991) (disagreeing with
Littleton's case for comparable worth).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
9 See Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of SexDiscriminationLaws, 56 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1311, 1329-31 (1989).
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2. The Disparate Impact Issue
Currently, it is not illegal discrimination to prefer traits that are
disproportionately distributed among races and ethnic groups or
between the genders. The disparate impact caused by such preferences may be evidence that the preferences are really covers for
racial, ethnic, or gender preferences that are themselves illegal
biases, proxies, aversions, or reaction qualifications. Much of the
controversy over when the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases shifts from the employee to the employer, and what the
employer must prove when the burden is shifted, is about the role
98
of disparate impact as evidence of illegal discrimination.
There are, however, those who want disparate impact on minority
races and ethnic groups as well as on women to be treated as illegal
discrimination per se, at least in the absence of an employer
justification that is compelling, and not just sufficient to negate the
inference of covert employer use of race, ethnicity, or gender.
Accordingly, even if the employer really does prefer the trait in
question for otherwise legitimate business reasons, use of the trait
should be prohibited, or so it is argued, if such use has a disparate
negative impact on certain groups, unless the employer can point to
disastrous consequences that use of a more evenly distributed trait
would produce. Furthermore, because there are a multitude of traits
employers may prefer that will be more commonly found in
nonminority males than in others, recognition of the disparate
impact cause of action would have quite far-reaching consequences.
Is it immoral for an employer to prefer a trait that is disproportionately uncommon in minority groups and women? It is surely not
obvious why this should be so, and proponents of disparate impact
illegality are usually quite opaque about their underlying rationale.

But there are two grounds for this position that seem most plausible.
First, there are negative social effects associated with some groups'
low socioeconomic status, and this status in turn is the product of
the preferences for traits that have a disparate impact. Second, even
if these negative effects are insufficient in themselves to deem the

preferences (extrinsically) immoral, when these effects are coupled
with the historical explanation for why the traits are unevenly
98 At least this was so after Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 65052 (1989), which eliminated the requirement from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971), that employersjustify disparate impact by proving business necessity.
See supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
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distributed-an explanation in which immoral discrimination is
central-the immorality of disparate-impact-producing preferences
99
emerges.
For reasons I have already given in my discussion of the morality
of discriminating on the basis of ordinary preferences, 1° ° I find
the case for disparate impact illegality quite unpersuasive. First, if
the disparate impact is traceable to the effects of past immoral and/
or illegal discrimination on the distribution of preferred traits, that
calls for reparations perhaps as a matter of justice, but not for
ignoring the traits people currently possess. Up until this section,
I have been assuming a framework of justice, one where all valid
claims for reparations have been honored. Suppose we now drop
this assumption and ask the following question: If one lacks a
preferred trait that one would have possessed were one not the
victim of wrongful discrimination, may one demand in addition to
compensation from one's victimizers that others overlook the
absence of the trait? Surely not. If I was a promising neurosurgeon
before my hands were mangled by a drunk driver, I cannot ask
others to ignore my lack of dexterity in their choice of neurosurgeons. If I was a beauty before an assault left my face scarred, I
cannot ask others to pick me to model. Preferences for scarce traits
do not become immoral merely because the scarcity is in part due
to the immoralities of others, even when just reparations have not
been fully paid.
That leaves us to consider the disparate impact itself without
regard to its causes. That is, is the fact that a preference will
produce disparate group impact along certain axes a cause for moral
concern in the unjust real world?
It is undeniably the case, as I earlier pointed out, that many
people, both within and without particular groups, care greatly about
how those groups qua groups are faring. Given alternative worlds
in which there are 100,000 doctors and 100,000 manual laborers,
they prefer the world in which 50,000 of each position are black and
50,000 of each position are white to the world in which 80,000
doctors are white and 80,000 laborers are black. This preference
holds, moreover, even if we eliminate all inferences from disparate
group impact to current racial discrimination.

91 See Strauss, supra note 21, at 1654 n.58.
' See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
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Should a discriminator be morally and legally compelled to
consider the effect of his preferences on others' group preferences?
As I pointed out in discussing ordinary preferences, in ajust society,
the affirmative case is quite weak. 10 1 It is perhaps strengthened
somewhat by pointing to a political divisiveness effect beyond mere
disappointment of others' group preferences. And it might be
strengthened even further by plausible claims that disparate impact
reduces aspirations caused by absence of role models within one's
group, or by plausible claims that disparate impact reinforces biases
and inaccurate negative stereotypes. Moreover, if we drop the
assumption of a just society, the case is further strengthened if
disparate impact disadvantages groups that correlate positively with
the group of unjustly disadvantaged.
There may, therefore, be some ordinary preferences that are
extrinsically immoral because they are shallow and easily forgone,
and because, as a result of disparate impact, they frustrate preferences for group advancement, contribute to political strife, reinforce
biases and stereotypes, sap motivation, and impact disproportionately individuals who are unjustly disadvantaged. Nevertheless, the
case seems quite shaky for blanket legal condemnation of all the
ordinary preferences that contribute to inequalities of socioeconomic
status of groups defined along certain axes, and it is untenable if
there are plausible and less costly alternatives to forbidding discrimi10 2
nation that produces disparate impact.
101 See supra text
102

accompanying notes 62-65.

Nonetheless, the number of commentators calling for such legal condemnation

is disconcertingly large. For representative examples, see Eichner, supra note 46, at
1416-17 (arguing thatjob requirements disproportionately excluding women cannot
bejustified by the costs of alternatives that would exclude women less, and that such
costs must be weighed against the value of equality-an idea I find difficult to grasp

except as part of a more general position in favor of equalizing wealth across the
board); Littleton, supra note 33, at 1284-85 (advocating equal treatment of all
"genderized" occupational choices in terms of resources, thereby virtually calling for
gender group equality of income); McCluskey, supra note 46, at 878-80 (treating
inequality among certain groups qua groups as wrong per se); see also Becker, supra
note 46, at 207-08.
Of course, if one drops the assumption of a basically just framework, worrying
about the equality effects of various preferences is more understandable, though not
the equality effects among groups qua groups as opposed to the equality effects among

individuals qua individuals. See, e.g., BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 18 (1980); RAWLS, supra note 8, at 504-12; Ronald Dworkin, What Is
Equality? Part2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 283-90 (1981); see
also Daniel Wikler, Paternalismand the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377, 392

(1979).
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This discussion of disparate impact may be the appropriate place
for bringing together various ideas that have been mentioned at
different points in the body of this article. In my background
assumptions I stated a general presumption in favor of macro
policies and against regulation of private preferences for effecting
social justice.'
At another point in this article I stated a presumption against moral positions that exact great individual
sacrifices for the general good. 0 4 At still another point I raised
the possibility that ordinary preferences that produce negative social
consequences might be immoral only if those with the preferences
were cheaper cost avoiders than those whose responding preferences
10 5
and reactions produced the negative social consequences.
These points are all related, and they all bear on why ordinary
preferences that produce disparate adverse impact on particular
groups will infrequently be immoral. If a particular ordinary
preference produces disparate impact, and there are plenty of close
substitutes available that would not, we might believe that those with
the preference should give it up and switch to the substitutes. Such
situations, however, are rarely ones where the disparate impact
produces major social harm. Disparate impact produces major social
harm where countless ordinary preferences and their substitutes will
produce the disparate impact. For example, where the production
of Coca-Cola requires skills not frequently found among the
members of a particular social group that is concerned with its status
as a group, but the production of Pepsi and RC Cola does not
require such unevenly distributed skills, little would be lost and
perhaps much would be gained by morally forbidding Coca-Cola
production. Disparate impact, however, gives rise to social costs only
when it is the product of a large number of different preferences,
not just preferences for Coca Cola, but preferences for Pepsi, RC
Cola, and a multitude of other goods and services as well. It is when
members of the same self-conscious group disproportionately lack
the skills necessary to satisfy all sorts of preferences, not just very
specific ones, that the negative social effects of disparate impact are
produced.
If this is the case, then those with ordinary preferences are
unlikely to be the cheapest cost avoiders, because, to avoid the costs,
they would have to give up, notjust particular preferences for which
103
104

105

See supra text accompanying note 3.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
See supra text accompanying notes 49, 62-67.
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there were available close substitutes, but a whole way of life. It is
no doubt true that our general preference for a society with a highly
advanced technology has been hard on the self-esteem of those with
skills most suitable for a primitive agrarian society. 1°6 Additionally, it is quite possible that a general preference for a primitive
agrarian society would result in a more egalitarian distribution of
esteemed traits. Nonetheless, few of us would condemn the
preferences for technology and the benefits it brings merely because

we are endowed unequally with the traits necessary to produce those
benefits.
When disparate impact and its negative effects are traceable to
countless ordinary preferences, we are unlikely to deem those with
the preferences to be the cheapest cost avoiders. To cure the
negative social effects we are more likely to turn our attention to
macro policies-educationjob training, redistribution of wealth-the
burdens of which fall much more uniformly across society, unlike
condemnations of particular ordinary preferences. 0 7 And those
whose group identifications and sympathies generate the social costs
of ordinary preferences will begin to look much more like the
cheapest cost avoiders than will those with the ordinary preferences.
Moreover, if we focus on helping the group defined as those
individuals who lack just shares of social benefits, and not on racial,
ethnic, gender, and similar social groups, macro policies look
obviously superior to attempting to change preferences and thereby
affect the share of resources various talents can command. 10 8
106 Cf Wikler, supra note 102, at 386-90 (discussing the social preference for a
technologically advanced way of life as it affects the ability of the mildly retarded to
live without being subjected to legal guardianship).
107 Mark Kelman notes the similarity between the costs of identifying those with
qualifications for a particular job and the costs of training those who would be
qualified if trained. From the employer's standpoint, costs are costs. Kelman
concludes that although both costs are utilitarian concerns, they are both offset by a
deontological claim that those with equal pre-training talent should have equal chances
in employment. See Kelman, supra note 21, at 1231-33, 1245-47. I cannot see the
deontological force of a claim based on raw talent, though others besides Kelman do.
Compare RAWLS, supra note 8, at 84, 87, 302-03 (endorsing a fair equality of
opportunity principle for those of equal talent) with Larry A. Alexander, FairEquality

of Opportunity:John Rawls' (Best) Forgotten Principle,11 PHIL. RES. ARCHIVEs 197, 206
(1986) (arguing that Rawls fails to provide a good explanation of why his fair equality
of opportunity principle would be favored independent of and prior to his general

difference principle).
10 I suspect that the notion of cheapest cost avoider is central to the assessment
of discriminatory preferences in ways beyond those just mentioned. For example,
concerns with "immutable" traits can, I think, be translated into cheapest cost avoider
concerns. So, too, perhaps can our notions ofwhen a trait is "relevant" to a particular
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3. The Private Affirmative Action Issue

Notwithstanding the previous section's conclusions on disparate
impact, the law currently permits an employer to adopt an affirmative action plan to ameliorate disparate impact and integrate her
workplace. The Weber case 1" that so decided was surely controversial, and the majority's interpretation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
rather dubious in my opinion, but the result is clear enough. A bona
fide voluntary affirmative action plan is not illegal discrimination
against those dispreferred. If integration and equality of group
status, rather than bias and aversion, are the employer's reasons for
discriminating, the laws do not prohibit it.110
The moral case for voluntary affirmative action is not as certain
as its legality. Voluntary affirmative action is rarely the product of
bias. Working in favor of voluntary affirmative action is its potential
to counteract the negative social effects of disparate group impact
noted in the previous section. Factors working against voluntary
affirmative action plans, however, include various negative social
effects it may itself engender, particularly when sponsored by major
private institutions. Ultimately, the moral case for or against
voluntary affirmative action plans is an empirical one that cannot be
settled from the armchair. Nonetheless, some potential negative
effects of affirmative action that bear on its morality are worth
mentioning. First, when major private institutions award jobs based
on race, they tend to produce or exacerbate racial balkanization and
racial politics. Racial groups will fight over their allocations ofjobs.
Some subgroups will demand their own allocation, while others will
wish to be included within larger groupings.
Second, individuals will attend less to improving their own
productivity and more to racial politics if racial group membership
is an alternative to productivity as a means of advancement. Third,
more productive groups will feel great resentment at being discriminated against because of their race. Civil strife born of resentment
will replace the civil strife born of unequal group status. Fourth,
negative biases toward and negative stereotypes regarding the
beneficiaries will as likely be reinforced or increased in number as
eliminated.
discriminatory choice.
109 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
110
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Fifth, the beneficiaries themselves may feel stigmatized, suffer
self-doubt, and in order to protect their self-esteem adopt what Chris
Wonnell calls the "affirmative action ideology," the claim that
meritocratic values are racist or sexist. 111 Indeed, affirmative
action beneficiaries will be more likely to adopt this ideology when
the values behind the ordinary preferences that affirmative action
trumps are deeply held by the affirmative action beneficiaries and
others.
Finally, affirmative action raises the costs to the employer and
thus to the consumer of satisfying ordinary preferences. Productivity
is reduced in the sense that priorities are shifted from producing
ordinary goods and services to producing more equality of groups.
Thus, private affirmative action is potentially a highly toxic form
of remedy for the negative effects of disparate impact. Its own
negative effects may be worse than those of group inequality. It is
not intrinsically immoral, and it is currently legal, but it may be
extrinsically immoral.
CONCLUSION

What makes wrongful discrimination wrong? I promised the
answer would be messy, and it is. Discrimination may be intrinsically
wrong because it is based upon biases, the incorrect judgments of
lesser moral worth, or upon the shallow aversions or inaccurate
negative stereotypes that are produced by such judgments. Discrimination may be intrinsically wrong because it is based on an
unjustifiable ideology of moral role. Discrimination based on deepseated aversions, accurate stereotypes, or reactions may be wrong,
but it is not intrinsically so. Rather, particular types of such
discrimination will be wrong in particular cultures, historical eras,
and contexts, and not wrong in others. Discrimination resulting
from preferences for goods and services, while wrong on occasion,
is rarely so. Despite our history of abysmal race relations and the
current state of racial strife as well as the long dominance in our
culture of an ideology of gender roles, disparate impact along racial
or gender lines rarely, if ever, warrants the conclusion that the
ordinary preference-based discrimination that produces it is
wrongful. The remedies for disparate impact, on the other handcomparable worth and affirmative action-are on morally less sure
footing.
III Wonnell, supra note 11, at 119-41.
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In short, in an otherwise just society, discriminatory preferences
are intrinsically morally wrong if premised on error, moral or factual,
about the dispreferred. Discriminatory preferences are extrinsically
morally wrong if their social costs are large relative to the costs of
eliminating or frustrating them. And if a discriminatory preference
is morally wrong--and if there is no moral right that protects its
exercise-then there is a case for legally prohibiting its exercise if the
costs of legal prohibition and enforcement are low relative to the
social gains to be achieved.
Thus, I end with these whimpers and no bang. What makes
discrimination wrong is usually quite complex as well as culturally
and historically variable. If I have only sorted out the complexity
and considerations accurately, I will be satisfied, for much discussion
of discrimination fails to attain analytical clarity and methodological
rigor. The topic always generates a fair amount of heat. It desperately needs more light.

